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2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

15 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 1st meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 April 2000, at 11 a.m.

Acting President: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez ..... (Colombia)
President: Mr. Baali ..... (Algeria)

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Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

00-40381 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 11.10 a.m.

Opening of the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of the Preparatory Committee

1. **The Acting President** declared open the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), convened pursuant to article VIII, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2, of the Treaty, and General Assembly resolution 51/45 A.

2. The Conference was the sixth of its kind, and the first to be held since May 1995, when the States parties had adopted decisions on the indefinite extension of the Treaty, the strengthening of its review process and the establishment of Principles and Objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, together with a resolution on the Middle East. The Conference was expected to consider the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 1995, taking into account the decisions and resolution adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, to identify areas where further progress was needed and to determine how such progress could be achieved.

3. In accordance with past practice, he formally introduced the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/1), adopted on 21 May 1999. The Committee had held three sessions during the period April 1997 to May 1999; 158 States parties to the Treaty had participated in the work of one or more of the sessions, which had also been attended by representatives of States not parties to the Treaty, specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations, academia and non-governmental organizations. For the first time, representatives of non-governmental organizations had been given an opportunity to address delegations at each of the sessions.

4. The Preparatory Committee had agreed on all the main issues related to the organization of the Conference. However, despite extensive discussion of, *inter alia*, the possibility of commencing negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, nuclear disarmament, security assurances for parties to the Treaty and implementation of the resolution on the Middle East, it had been unable to reach agreement on any substantive recommendation to the 2000 Conference.

Election of the President of the Conference

5. **The Acting President** said that at its resumed session in December 1999, the Preparatory Committee had decided to recommend to the 2000 Review Conference the election of Mr. Abdallah Baali (Algeria) as President.

6. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) was elected President of the Conference by acclamation.*

7. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) took the Chair.*

Statement by the President of the Conference

8. **The President** said that in 1995, when the States parties had decided to extend the Treaty indefinitely, the nuclear-weapon States had solemnly undertaken to continue their efforts to systematically and progressively reduce their nuclear stockpiles; States that had remained outside the non-proliferation regime had been urged to join it; and agreement had been reached on a new review process. Unfortunately, many of the commitments made on that occasion had yet to be fulfilled, and the lack of progress towards nuclear disarmament had given rise to a feeling of frustration on the part of many countries and of international civil society.

9. In 1998, India and Pakistan had dealt a serious blow to the global non-proliferation regime by conducting nuclear tests, as a result of which the world was facing the spectre of nuclear war for the first time since the end of the cold war. Cuba and three States with nuclear capabilities — Israel, India and Pakistan — had not yet become parties to the Treaty; the Senate of the United States of America had refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Russian Federation and the United States of America had made no progress towards nuclear disarmament owing to the delay in the entry into force of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) and the failure to commence negotiations on START III. Other grounds for concern included the new nuclear strategies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Russian Federation; the challenges to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the intention of the United States of America to deploy an anti-missile defence system; the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament, as a result of which negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material had

not commenced; and the fact that there were currently 30,000 nuclear weapons worldwide.

10. However, the picture was not entirely a negative one. The Russian Parliament had recently ratified START II; since 1995, the NPT had been ratified by Chile, Vanuatu, United Arab Emirates, Comoros, Andorra, Djibouti, Angola, Oman and Brazil, bringing the number of States parties to 187 and making it the most universal of all the multilateral disarmament instruments; the Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements, adopted in May 1997, had increased the efficiency and effectiveness of the safeguards regime; nuclear-weapon States had taken unilateral measures to reduce their stockpiles and introduce greater transparency; new treaties had established nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia, and efforts to denuclearize Central Asia were nearing fruition; and the CTBT had been opened for signature in September 1996, within the deadlines established at the 1995 Conference, and had been signed by 155 States and ratified by 55, including 2 nuclear-weapon States and 28 States with nuclear capabilities.

11. Regardless of the differing perspectives of States parties, much remained to be done and the outcome of the Conference would have a major influence on the future of the Treaty and of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The role of civil society was crucial to future progress, and he therefore welcomed the contribution of non-governmental organizations. He urged States parties to bridge their differences and to seek agreement on realistic measures to promote the realization of the goals of the Treaty. The global community would be following the work of the Conference with high expectations and must not be disappointed.

Address by the Secretary-General of the United Nations

12. **The Secretary-General** said that at a time of extraordinary change and challenge in the relations between and within States, it was more important than ever to focus on halting nuclear proliferation and on reducing the weapons of mass destruction that continued to threaten the very existence of human life on the planet.

13. While no one could be satisfied with the degree of implementation of the Treaty, the fact that 187 States had become parties to it testified to its global appeal, and there had been genuine progress during the past five years. The number of nuclear weapons had continued to decline since the end of the cold war; most nuclear-weapon States had declared that they were not producing fissile material for weapons; former rivals were cooperating to reduce the threats posed by their weapons; safeguards had been enhanced; membership in nuclear-weapon-free zones had grown; the CTBT had been negotiated and, although it was not yet in force, there was a de facto moratorium on testing. The Russian Federation had decided to ratify START II and the CTBT; he hoped that the ratification would enhance the prospects of those treaties entering into force.

14. Nonetheless, nuclear conflict remained a real and terrifying possibility which imposed an obligation on States parties to use every instrument at their disposal to pursue the goals of the NPT with equal and unwavering determination. The discovery of clandestine nuclear-weapons-development programmes and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction remained a major threat to peace. Compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations had not always been satisfactory, and he called on all parties to increase their efforts to combat that common threat and to sign and bring into force the IAEA Additional Protocol designed to enhance assurances regarding compliance.

15. The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan were clear evidence of the need to fight proliferation. Some 35,000 nuclear weapons remained in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. For many years, there had been no disarmament negotiations on strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament remained the single multilateral body for such negotiations, yet its efforts had been frustrated by a lack of consensus. Much of the established multilateral disarmament machinery had started to rust, a problem due not to the machinery itself but to the apparent lack of political will to use it. Recent years had seen a reaffirmation of the nuclear-weapons doctrines of all the nuclear-weapon States. Some States retained first-use doctrines, while others did not exclude the use of such weapons even against non-nuclear-weapon States. Lack of transparency as to the number of weapons and amount of nuclear material remained a problem, and the growing pressure to deploy national missile

defences was jeopardizing the ABM Treaty and could well lead to a new arms race. He hoped that States would weigh those dangers and challenges before embarking on a process likely to reduce rather than enhance global security.

16. He believed that States parties had it in their power to meet those challenges successfully. The most effective way to do so would be to embark on a results-based treaty review process, focusing on specific benchmarks such as the entry into force of the CTBT, deep, irreversible reductions in nuclear-weapons stocks, the consolidation of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the negotiation of new ones, binding security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States parties, and improvement in the transparency of reporting on nuclear weapons arsenals and nuclear materials. Lastly, he proposed that member States should reaffirm at the highest political level their commitment to reducing the dangers that arose from existing nuclear weapons and the further proliferation thereof.

Address by the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency

17. **Mr. El-Baradei** (Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)) said that the 1995 decision to extend indefinitely the NPT had been taken in an atmosphere of expectation that the Treaty would be invigorated through accelerated efforts towards nuclear disarmament, a strengthened verification regime and expanded peaceful nuclear cooperation.

18. IAEA safeguards played a key role in the non-proliferation regime and a number of the Principles and Objectives agreed to in 1995 had a direct relevance to those safeguards. The Agency had continued to function as the competent authority to verify compliance with safeguards obligations under article III of the Treaty. Since the beginning of 1995, a further 28 States parties had brought comprehensive safeguards agreements into force, raising the total to 128. The Agency was making every effort to encourage the remaining 54 States parties to conclude such agreements.

19. Remarkable progress had been achieved in strengthening the effectiveness of safeguards. The discovery of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons programme had been both a setback and a watershed for the safeguards system. It had jolted the international community into considering urgent ways and means to strengthen the system, in particular to equip it with the ability to provide assurance regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities.

20. Some of the strengthening measures could be anchored to the Agency's existing authority, but others required additional legal authority. In May 1997, after a year of deliberations, the Agency's Board of Governors had adopted a Model Additional Protocol to Safeguards Agreements, which was intended to be the standard for additional instruments to be concluded with non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The new protocol gave the Agency the means to provide credible and comprehensive assurances of compliance with non-proliferation commitments, empowering it to seek a broad range of information covering all aspects of a State's nuclear and nuclear-related activities. It also provided broader right of access for Agency inspectors to nuclear and nuclear-related facilities and contained new administrative arrangements to improve the effectiveness of safeguards.

21. Pursuant to the safeguards agreements, the Agency had the right and obligation to ensure that all nuclear material in peaceful nuclear activities of States was subject to safeguards; its obligation was not limited to declared nuclear material but also extended to that which was required to be declared. Under the new protocol, it would be able to provide assurance not only of the non-diversion of declared material, but also of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities. It was therefore disappointing that only 44 non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had concluded additional protocols and that only 9 such protocols had entered into force. He appealed to those that had not yet done so to conclude additional protocols at the earliest possible date. The secretariat was developing modalities to adapt existing safeguards activities to the new strengthening measures and expected to complete the technical framework by the end of 2001.

22. The 1995 Principles and Objectives had stressed that fissile material transferred from military to peaceful use should be placed under Agency safeguards as soon as possible. Since 1996, the Agency had been involved in consultations with the Russian Federation and the United States of America to examine the legal, technical and financial aspects of

verification of such material, and significant progress had been made on a model verification agreement and technical systems and equipment.

23. The Agency had established a programme in 1995 for the security of nuclear and radioactive material to protect it against theft and other misuses and to prevent, detect and respond to illicit trafficking. A 1998 review had resulted in strengthened guidelines on protecting nuclear facilities and nuclear material in transport, use and storage against sabotage.

24. Despite the increased amount of nuclear material and the greater complexity of the facilities to be safeguarded, the Agency's budget for safeguards had been virtually frozen for over a decade as a result of a policy of zero real growth. That had led to an increasing reliance on extrabudgetary funding, which inhibited proper planning and efficiency.

25. Two cases of non-compliance with safeguards agreements must be mentioned. With regard to Iraq, the Agency had not been in a position since December 1998 to implement its mandate under Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Although it had recently been able to inspect nuclear material subject to safeguards which was still in Iraq, that inspection had been limited and was no substitute for the required activities under the relevant Security Council resolutions. Currently, therefore, the Agency could not provide any assurance that Iraq was in compliance with its obligations.

26. With regard to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, there was regrettably little to report since the 1995 Conference. The Agency remained unable to verify its initial declaration of nuclear material subject to safeguards and could not, therefore, provide any assurance about non-diversion. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea was still in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement, which remained valid and in force. It continued to accept Agency activities solely in the context of the agreed framework which it had concluded in October 1994 with the United States of America. As requested by the Security Council, the Agency was monitoring a freeze of graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities under that agreement. The degree of cooperation received continued to be limited.

27. Turning to peaceful nuclear cooperation, he said that the major goal of the Agency's technical cooperation activities had been to address the major sustainable development priorities of recipient States in a cost-effective manner. Technical cooperation among developing countries continued to be a key strategy because it promoted sustainable project activities by building self-reliance and mutual assistance. The largest proportion of Agency assistance involved non-power applications. For instance, in 1999 about 85 per cent of its technical cooperation had been in the areas of human health, food and agriculture, water resources management, environmental monitoring, industrial uses and related radiation protection and safety. Training was also an important aspect of technical cooperation activities.

28. A priority objective of the Agency was to establish a comprehensive and effective worldwide nuclear safety culture, which would be aided by a comprehensive set of international conventions prescribing the basic legal norms for the safe use of nuclear technology. The Agency would continue to strengthen its safeguards system, but without safeguards agreements it could not provide any assurances of compliance, and without the additional protocols it could provide only limited assurances that did not adequately cover the absence of undeclared material or activities. It would continue to strive for maximum efficiency in its safeguards operation but would not be able to fulfil its mandate unless those activities were fully funded. In 1999, of the 130 member States of IAEA, only 43 had pledged 100 per cent or more of their assessed target. Regrettably, 57 had made no pledges whatsoever. Although from a strictly legal point of view contributions to the Technical Cooperation Fund were voluntary, they were regarded as solemn obligations that must be respected.

29. The new safeguards had strengthened the non-proliferation regime, but verification could not work in a vacuum. It should continue to be supported by effective physical protection and export control arrangements, enforcement mechanisms and, above all, regional and global security arrangements. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was a key component of the Treaty regime, but it required adequate, predictable and assured technical cooperation resources. To that end, all States parties should pay their target contributions in full and on time.

30. The Treaty regime, which had been painstakingly constructed over three decades, should not be allowed to unravel, and it should be made universal. Of crucial importance to that end was an unequivocal commitment by all nations to its basic tenets:

adherence to the regime and the verification system, enhancement of peaceful nuclear cooperation and transfer of technology, and above all, active negotiation towards nuclear disarmament.

Adoption of the rules of procedure

31. **The President** drew attention to the draft rules of procedure, contained in annex VI, of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF/2000/1), which had been submitted to the Conference by the Chairman of the third session of Preparatory Committee. He took it that the Conference wished to adopt the draft rules of procedure.

32. *It was so decided.*

33. **The President**, referring to rule 44, paragraph 1, of the rules of procedure, said that requests for observer status had been received from Cuba and Palestine. He took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

34. *It was so decided.*

35. **The President**, referring to rule 44, paragraph 3, of the rules of procedure, said that requests for observer status had been received from the following organizations: the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the South Pacific Forum, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, the European Commission, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the League of Arab States, the Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for the Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC). He took it that the Conference wished to accede to those requests.

36. *It was so decided.*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

37. **The President** said that, at its third session, the Preparatory Committee had agreed to recommend the following as Chairmen of the three Main Committees: Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Colombia), Main Committee I; Mr. Kobieracki (Poland), Main Committee II; Mr. Reimaa (Finland), Main Committee III. The Preparatory Committee had also agreed to recommend that the post of Chairman of the Drafting Committee should be assumed by a representative of the Group of Eastern European States and the post of Chairman of the Credentials Committee by a representative of the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States, and it had subsequently nominated Mr. Erdös (Hungary) and Mr. Widodo (Indonesia), respectively.

38. *Mr. Reyes Rodríguez (Colombia), Mr. Kobieracki (Poland), Mr. Reimaa (Finland), Mr. Erdös (Hungary) and Mr. Widodo (Indonesia) were elected Chairmen of Main Committee I, Main Committee II, Main Committee III, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee, respectively.*

39. **The President** said that consultations on the election of the Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee had not yet been concluded. The election would therefore be postponed.

Election of Vice-Presidents

40. **The President** said that the Conference had received the following nominations for the 34 posts of Vice-President: from the Group of Eastern European States: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Ukraine; from the Group of Western European and Other States: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand and United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; and from the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States: Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal, South Africa, Islamic Republic of Iran, Uzbekistan, Viet Nam, Mexico, Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica and China.

41. *Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cameroon, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Germany, Islamic Republic of Iran, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Peru, Romania, Senegal, South Africa, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and Viet Nam were elected Vice-Presidents of the Conference.*

42. **The President** said that the Group of Non-Aligned and Other States would submit five additional nominations after further consultations.

Credentials of Representatives to the Conference

(a) **Appointment of the Credentials Committee**

43. **The President**, referring to rule 3 of the rules of procedure, which provided that six members of the Credentials Committee were to be appointed on the proposal of the President of the Conference, said that consultations were continuing on nominations to the Credentials Committee and that he would convey to the Conference the outcome of those consultations at the appropriate time.

Confirmation of the nomination of the Secretary-General

44. **The President** said that, at its first session, the Preparatory Committee had decided to invite the Secretary-General of the United Nations, in consultation with members of the Preparatory Committee, to nominate an official to act as provisional Secretary-General of the 2000 Review Conference. At its third session, the Secretary-General had nominated Ms. Hannelore Hoppe, Department of Disarmament Affairs, as provisional Secretary-General.

45. *Ms. Hoppe was confirmed as Secretary-General of the 2000 Review Conference.*

Adoption of the agenda

46. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to adopt the agenda as contained in annex VII of the final report of the Preparatory Committee (NPT/CONF.2000/1) and the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee in annex VIII on the allocation of items to the Main Committees of the Conference.

47. *The agenda and the recommendation were adopted.*

Programme of work

48. **The President**, referring to rule 34 of the rules of procedure, said that, after consultations, the following draft decision had been proposed:

> "The Conference of States parties to the NPT decides to establish for the duration of the 2000 Review Conference a subsidiary body under Main Committee I and Main Committee II, respectively.
>
> "The Conference further decides that:
>
> "I. The subsidiary body established under Main Committee I as subsidiary body 1 will discuss and consider the practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 decision on 'Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament'. The subsidiary body will be chaired by Ambassador Clive Pearson of New Zealand. The subsidiary body will be open-ended. It will hold 4 meetings within the overall time allocated to the Main Committee. The meetings will be held in private.
>
> "II. The subsidiary body established under Main Committee II as subsidiary body 2 will examine the regional issues, including with respect to the Middle East and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution. The subsidiary body will be open-ended. It will hold 4 meetings within the overall time allocated to the Main Committee. The meetings will be held in private.
>
> "The outcome of the work of the subsidiary bodies will be reflected in the report of the respective Main Committees to the Conference."

49. *The draft decision was adopted.*

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2000/SR.2

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

12 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 2nd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 24 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. **Baali**	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. **Alemán** (Vice-President)	(Ecuador)
later:	Mr. **Baali** (President)	(Algeria)

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00-40388 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

General debate

1. **Mr. Monteiro** (Portugal), speaking on behalf of the European Union, the associated countries Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Turkey, and, in addition, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, said that they supported wholeheartedly the objectives set out in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and were committed to the effective implementation of the decisions and the resolution adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The 2000 Review Conference should confirm the Treaty's fundamental role in strengthening international peace and security, pursuing disarmament and promoting the global non-proliferation regime. It must take stock of what had been achieved in those fields over the past five years and identify the areas in which and the means through which further progress should be sought in the future.

2. The European Union noted with satisfaction that, since 1995, nine additional States had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and called on the four States that had not yet done so, in particular the three that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to take steps to become parties to the Treaty. The nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan were a cause for deep concern. The European Union appealed to countries in South Asia to make every effort to prevent a nuclear arms race, which would be detrimental not only to stability and security in the region, but also to international efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. It welcomed the readiness of India and Pakistan to participate in negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and called on those countries to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). It urged Pakistan to follow India's lead in establishing nuclear-related export controls.

3. The Union remained committed to the full implementation of the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. It continued to support efforts to establish a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and appealed to the only State in the region that had not yet done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and place its nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The European Union called on Iraq to comply with Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to cooperate with IAEA and to implement fully the agreement that it had concluded with the Agency.

4. The European Union looked forward to the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which would take place following its ratification by 44 States. The States members of the Union, all of which had signed and ratified the Treaty, were actively promoting universal adherence to that instrument. They therefore welcomed the announcement that the State Duma of the Russian Federation had approved the Treaty for ratification. However, the delay in its ratification by the United States of America was deeply regrettable. The European Union wished to underscore the need to provide adequate financial support for the establishment of the international monitoring system envisaged in the Treaty.

5. The Union called for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and urged all States to cease production of such material. It would continue to encourage nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals of nuclear weapons and promote the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. It welcomed the steps taken in that direction and towards the application of the principle of irreversibility in the fields of nuclear disarmament and arms control and considered increased transparency an important confidence-building measure.

6. The approval for ratification of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) by the State Duma of the Russian Federation was an important step towards enhancing global stability and security. The European Union called for the prompt entry into force and timely implementation of the Treaty and its protocol and urged an early start to the negotiations on a third strategic arms reduction treaty. It also wished to see non-strategic nuclear weapons included in the framework of arms reduction efforts. The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of

Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) was a pillar of strategic stability, which should be maintained.

7. The security assurances provided by the protocols of the nuclear-weapon-free zones and the unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States that were a means of addressing the security concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by assuring them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The European Union stood ready to consider further steps, which could take the form of an internationally legally binding instrument.

8. The Union welcomed the progress made since 1995 in the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which were a valuable complement to the Treaty, and it strongly supported the signature and ratification by the nuclear-weapon States of the relevant protocols for those zones. Another positive step was the adoption by the Disarmament Commission of guidelines for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

9. The existing system of IAEA safeguards must be strengthened and the Agency's ability to detect clandestine nuclear activity enhanced in order to address successfully the proliferation challenges that lay ahead. The European Union called on all non-nuclear-weapon States to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency, in accordance with article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and urged all States that had safeguards agreements with IAEA to conclude an Additional Protocol. It appealed to nuclear-weapon States to place fissile material no longer required for defence purposes under appropriate international safeguards and physical protection.

10. There must be international cooperation to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. States participating in such activities must be mindful of their responsibilities to use sensitive materials, equipment and technology in a way that did not jeopardize the non-proliferation regime. The establishment of an appropriate system of export controls should be regarded not as a hindrance, but as an essential element for furthering close cooperation in the use of nuclear energy and generating confidence among suppliers, recipient States and the international community that nuclear materials, equipment and technology would be used only for peaceful purposes. There was a need for greater transparency in the field of nuclear-related export controls. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee were to be commended for their efforts in that direction.

11. The European Union called on all States with nuclear materials in their territories to maintain or improve, as appropriate, their arrangements for nuclear materials accounting, safety and physical protection and urged all States that had not already done so to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, introduce relevant physical protection and safety standards, and adopt and enforce appropriate measures and legislation to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. Lastly, it also wished to emphasize the importance of continuing international cooperation in order to enhance nuclear safety, waste management and radiological protection.

12. **Ms. Green** (Mexico), speaking also on behalf of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, New Zealand, South Africa and Sweden, said that while the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had produced a renewed commitment to nuclear disarmament, it was regrettable that little progress had been made to date. In an effort to provide some fresh impetus, Mexico and the six other countries were putting forward a flexible, realistic programme of action in a working paper entitled "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda". The essential requirement in that connection was a clear commitment by the nuclear States to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals.

13. The international community aspired to a world free of nuclear weapons, and the International Court of Justice had ruled that anything short of total nuclear disarmament would be unacceptable. Accordingly, it was for the nuclear-weapon States to rise to the challenge by reducing their arsenals. That would be a major stride towards the common goal, and it would also spur the international community to greater efforts. The trend in the previous five years had rather been in the opposite direction: two States that were not parties to the NPT had tested nuclear weapons, while one non-party State had continued to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and had not renounced the option of possessing nuclear weapons. Moreover, the two main nuclear-weapon States had hardly set a persuasive example. The general picture had been one of complacency and indifference.

14. Worse yet, it was clear that nuclear weapons continued to play a central role in strategic planning; and that the possibility of waging nuclear war continued to be contemplated, despite the fact that the situation which had originally given rise to proliferation no longer existed. The attainment of a world free of nuclear weapons would require common action by all States, but the United States of America and the Russian Federation would have to display leadership in that connection. The Russian Federation's recent ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) was welcome, and the United States should complete its ratification procedure as soon as possible. All nuclear-weapon States should join in a process aimed at eliminating all their nuclear weapons, a process that should be characterized by the principle of irreversibility.

15. The total elimination of nuclear weapons would undoubtedly take time. In the meanwhile, nuclear-weapon States should adopt interim measures designed to reduce the risk of detonation, accidentally or as a result of a deliberate decision. The working paper "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World" set forth several such measures: nuclear-weapon States should adopt no-first-use policies vis-à-vis each other, and no-use policies vis-à-vis non-nuclear States; nuclear weapons should be taken off alert status, and warheads separated from delivery systems; the deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be discontinued; and non-nuclear States should be given adequate security guarantees.

16. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had been a fundamental step forward in the nuclear disarmament agenda. Those nuclear-weapon States that had not yet ratified it were urged to do so. A treaty on fissionable materials was also essential. Pending the conclusion of such a treaty, nuclear-weapon States should declare a moratorium on the production of such materials for use in making weapons, and non-party States with nuclear facilities should immediately suspend the production of fissionable materials for that purpose.

17. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the extension of existing ones, would be positive measures, especially in regions of tension, such as the Middle East and South Asia. Organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be mandated to develop the effective monitoring procedures that a world free of nuclear weapons would require. An international conference on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in accordance with a recent suggestion of the Secretary-General, would be a positive measure.

18. Although an overwhelming majority of States were parties to the NPT, the three non-party States that were operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and pursuing nuclear weapon development programmes were crucial to the attainment of the objective of a world free of nuclear weapons. The Review Conference should focus on them, encouraging them to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, and seeking to have their nuclear facilities made subject to IAEA safeguards. The NPT was at a critical turning-point. The working paper, "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda" offered a constructive means of achieving the common goal.

19. **Mr. Fasla** (Algeria) said that, by depositing its instruments of accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the eve of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Algeria had demonstrated its commitment to nuclear disarmament and promoting the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. There had been a number of important developments since the 1995 Conference, including the accession of a further nine States to the Treaty; ratification by 55 States, among them two nuclear-weapon States, of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and the establishment of new nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was fitting that on the eve of the 2000 Review Conference, the Russian State Duma had approved for ratification the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the START II Treaty. However, other developments, particularly the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia, had shown that much remained to be done to achieve the objective of general and complete disarmament.

20. While the NPT had proved to be an effective means of stemming horizontal proliferation, it had been less successful in checking vertical proliferation, which ran counter to its letter and spirit. Furthermore, the many initiatives taken since the Treaty's conclusion had been aimed more at the reduction of nuclear arsenals, than at their elimination. In the Middle East, the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction had been stymied by the nuclear capacity of Israel, which remained outside the system of international controls. Developing countries desiring to use nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes were faced with insurmountable obstacles. In that connection, the reduction of the resources provided to IAEA was a cause for concern. The security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States had been undermined by the selective and restrictive approach taken in Security Council resolutions 255 (1968) and 984 (1995). There had been little progress in the implementation of the Concluding Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, and there was frustration at the slow pace of the multilateral negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament.

21. The 2000 Review Conference should reaffirm the validity of the decision on "Principles and objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference and examine means of achieving further progress in its implementation. The non-proliferation regime must be maintained. The agreements concluded between the United States of America and the Russian Federation were encouraging steps, but new reductions were necessary and the other nuclear-weapon States must take measures of a similar scope with a view to achieving the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

22. Every effort must be made to promote the earliest entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Algeria had signed that instrument in October 1996 and had already begun the ratification process. There was also a need for the immediate commencement of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for military use, under which existing stocks would be subject to effective international control. Algeria had proposed the establishment within the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee for that purpose, as well as an ad hoc committee on disarmament. The security assurances given to non-nuclear-weapon States must be enhanced, must neither be open to interpretation, nor subject to veto and must be codified in a legally binding instrument. More must be done to realize the legitimate right of developing States to have access to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and there must be specific measures to promote the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in areas of tension.

23. Algeria had been the third African State to ratify the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). No such zone had been established in the Middle East, which was a cause of deep concern to Algeria given the close links between Africa and that region and its physical proximity. The adoption by the 1995 Conference of the "Resolution on the Middle East" had shown that that concern was shared by all the States Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the nuclear-weapon States. His delegation welcomed the decision to establish a subsidiary body during the Conference to consider the application of that resolution.

24. His delegation was convinced that nuclear disarmament must remain the absolute priority and that there must be a clear undertaking to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. The subsidiary body established to consider the issue of nuclear disarmament during the Conference should examine the progress made in that area and the steps that remained to be taken.

25. The Conference must strengthen the political and moral authority of the Treaty and promote its universality. To that end, it must call on all States that had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty and to place their nuclear installations under the control of IAEA. As to the functioning of the review process itself, the preparatory process should focus on substantive issues. It was to be hoped that the decisions of the 2000 Review Conference would constitute genuine milestones on the path to attaining a nuclear-weapon-free world.

26. **Mr. Cowen** (Ireland) noted that of late there had been some positive developments in the area of nuclear disarmament: the United States of America and the Russian Federation had undertaken bilateral nuclear force reductions, and the Russian Federation had ratified both the START II Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The two nuclear Powers that had not yet ratified the CTBT should do so: nuclear testing had no place on the small planet known as the Earth.

27. The NPT had reached a crucial point: while 182 States had committed themselves to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, the total elimination of nuclear weapons remained a distant goal. But in accordance with the underlying bargain of the Treaty, non-nuclear States had refrained from the development of nuclear weapons in return for binding commitments by the nuclear States to eliminate their existing

arsenals. In response to that unsatisfactory state of affairs, Ireland and six other countries had put forward a working paper entitled "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda" which was a realistic programme of action leading to a world free of nuclear weapons. It was premised on a new political undertaking by the five nuclear States to eliminate their nuclear weapons while engaging in an accelerated process of negotiation and measures leading to nuclear disarmament.

28. Such an initiative was necessary because the response to the NPT's goal of a world free of nuclear weapons had not been adequate to date: reductions in existing arsenals were being offset by modernization and research. The danger was that the NPT, the cornerstone of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, would wither away through complacency and neglect. Nuclear weapons, intended to annihilate entire continents and cultures, had never had general moral acceptance, and the International Court of Justice had concluded that the indefinite possession of them would be indefensible. Accordingly, a complacent approach was inappropriate: the time to proceed, with serious intent, to rid the world of nuclear weapons was at once.

29. Three non-party States, India, Pakistan and Israel, were continuing to disregard the norms which States parties had adopted. In implementing their obligations under the NPT, nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States alike denied legitimacy to any State embarking on nuclear weapons proliferation. Nuclear weapons were not a valid response to perceived threats to security. The danger of a nuclear Armageddon must outweigh all such considerations. It was therefore essential to take measures to ensure the continued vitality of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime, and to that end the approach outlined in the working paper "Towards a Nuclear-Weapons-Free World" was eminently relevant.

30. A treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons — a fissile materials cut-off treaty (FMCT) — would be an important preliminary step in the NPT regime for nuclear disarmament, as it would initiate a process of extending controls over all such materials. Negotiations on such a treaty should therefore begin without delay. The pace of those negotiations should not be dictated by the three States remaining outside the international consensus on nuclear disarmament. Nor should inaction on the part of the members of that consensus be allowed to contribute to the development of the nuclear option by those States. One approach might be for the five nuclear-weapon States to negotiate the text of a draft FMCT and submit it jointly to the Conference on Disarmament for further elaboration and adoption as a multilateral instrument, while those five States themselves proceeded with the provisional application of its core provisions, pending its adoption.

31. The Conference's review of the implementation of the NPT must address the issue of compliance with its purposes and provisions, as the application of safeguards and the right to participate in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were among its core features. The adoption in 1997 of the Model Additional Protocol to existent Safeguards Agreements had been an important demonstration of political will on the part of non-nuclear-weapon States to enhance non-proliferation assurances when required. The Irish Parliament was moving to ratify the Additional Protocol.

32. The review process for the NPT required strengthening, as the States parties had recognized at the 1995 Conference. It was clear, however, that the selected mechanism of a preparatory committee was inadequate for that purpose. It might be preferable to convene annual general conferences of States parties, with a view to a more systematic and regular review of implementation of the Treaty. The experience of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America was instructive in that connection.

33. The NPT needed strengthening for the simple reason that the world must give up nuclear weapons as a factor in international security. Accordingly, it was essential for the Conference to agree, finally and definitively, on a common understanding of what the full implementation of the Treaty required, and what the participants' peoples expected of them.

34. *Mr. Alemán (Ecuador), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

35. **Mr. Minty** (South Africa) said that nuclear weapons were the only one of the three types of weapons of mass destruction that had not been banned, and in view of their unparalleled potential for large-scale annihilation, it was important to make the world safer by ridding it of them. The 1995 Review and Extension Conference had determined that the Treaty

should be indefinitely extended, and that the review process should be strengthened. The task of the 2000 Conference was to ensure that those objectives were attained.

36. The intervening five-year period had not been auspicious: nuclear-weapon States continued to rely on those weapons in their strategic planning, there had been nuclear test explosions in South Asia, START II was moving slowly, there were proposals for a missile defence system in the United States, there were continuing difficulties in bringing the CTBT into force, and the Conference on Disarmament had not begun negotiations on a fissile materials treaty. Moreover, the nuclear-weapon States had not eliminated their arsenals of nuclear weapons, non-nuclear-weapon States had not received effective security assurances, and the unencumbered transfer of peaceful nuclear technology had not been achieved.

37. To be sure, there had been positive developments as well: the great majority of non-nuclear-weapon States continued to fulfil their obligations relating to non-proliferation, a number of States had acceded to the NPT, and the Russian Federation had ratified START II and the CTBT. The United States and the Russian Federation were carrying out bilateral nuclear arms reductions. Such reductions, however welcome, were not to be confused with nuclear disarmament; they had to do with cold war concepts of the strategic balance of power and the like. The five nuclear-weapon States should unequivocally undertake to eliminate their nuclear arsenals, a step that would enhance confidence in the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes. It would also demonstrate the validity of the core bargain struck in the NPT, namely a commitment by non-nuclear-weapon States not to pursue the acquisition of nuclear weapons in return for the agreement of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue nuclear disarmament.

38. Other positive steps would be the full implementation of the START II Treaty and the beginning of substantive negotiations on START III, the integration of nuclear-weapon States other than the United States and the Russian Federation into the START process, de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons and expansion of the nuclear arms reduction process on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, and application of the principle of irreversibility in all nuclear disarmament, arms reduction and arms control measures.

39. While the nuclear-weapon States certainly bore the primary responsibility for eliminating nuclear weapons, there were useful actions open to other States. For example, the three States — India, Israel and Pakistan — that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities should abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons development and accede to the NPT; the CTBT should be brought into force, quickly and unconditionally, and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should conclude its negotiations on a fissile materials treaty. Those and other creative measures were set forth in the "New Agenda" that had been introduced by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico in response to a deep concern about the regrettable lack of progress towards the common goals of the NPT. The key features of that very welcome initiative were an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons, and to a step-by-step process leading to that goal.

40. South Africa welcomed the steps that had been taken since 1995 to strengthen the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), including the conclusion of negotiations for an Additional Protocol. Universal implementation of the Additional Protocol was desirable; unfortunately, however, some 60 States parties had not yet taken the necessary first step of concluding a Safeguards Agreement with the Agency. IAEA should make a special effort to help those States by guiding them through the process.

41. The Agency had acquired greater authority for exercising its responsibility in implementing international safeguards. At the same time, it was responsible for merging conventional quantitative safeguards and more recent, qualitative safeguards into an integrated safeguards system, one that would be flexible, effective, and above all cost-efficient. The task represented a major challenge. Certainly progress had been made, but it was clear that much remained to be done.

42. Non-nuclear-weapon States stood to benefit under the NPT in two major ways: they were relieved of the threat resulting from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and they gained nuclear technology for peaceful applications in such fields as health, agriculture and industry. The Agency's Technical Cooperation Programme was thus potentially valuable, and consequently it was regrettable that the Voluntary Technical Cooperation Fund had been unable to meet

the legitimate needs of developing countries. The previous 15 years, in fact, had been characterized by a widening disparity between needs and resources. It was important to find ways of making the Fund more stable.

43. **Ms. Albright** (United States of America) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was proving to be effective and, therefore, radical changes of course were not necessary. Bilaterally, and through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Treaty had fostered peaceful uses of the atom in such areas as cancer treatment, infant health, power supply, food production and clean water supplies. The Treaty had also facilitated peaceful nuclear cooperation.

44. The Indian and Pakistani tests of May 1998, which had challenged the Treaty's ability to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, had been met with a firm international response in Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). Her delegation continued to seek universal adherence, in South Asia and beyond, to the Treaty, which deliberately lacked provisions on new nuclear-weapon States. While her delegation was not opposed to discussing universal adherence in the Middle East, the Conference should be fair and balanced and understand that the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in that region depended on the broader peace process. In the Americas, Cuba stood alone as a non-party to the Treaty.

45. With regard to universal compliance with the Treaty, her delegation strongly supported the IAEA strengthened safeguards and urged all parties to adopt them. Also in the interest of universal compliance, it believed that Iraq should not be allowed to dictate the terms of its compliance with either its Treaty obligations or United Nations resolutions and welcomed the partial progress achieved in North Korea as a result of inspections under the Treaty regime.

46. Responding to claims that the five nuclear-weapon States were not making sufficient efforts to bring about nuclear disarmament under article VI, she noted the Russian State Duma's recent action on the START II Treaty and on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which her delegation welcomed, and the United States Senate's overwhelming vote approving the Treaty several years earlier. President Clinton had dealt with concerns raised by missile defences openly and in consultation with both the United States Congress and the country's allies and other countries, including the Russian Federation and China. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty could easily be amended to reflect new realities. Moreover, the missile defence system in question, capable of repelling, at most, a few dozen incoming missiles, was not intended to degrade the Russian deterrent.

47. Since the end of the cold war, remarkable progress in nuclear disarmament had been achieved as a result of strategic negotiations between the United States and the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation's ratification of START II would give fresh impetus to START III negotiations on reducing deployed strategic warheads by 80 per cent from peak cold-war levels. Progress towards continued strategic reductions would be a major goal of the upcoming summit between President Clinton and President Putin.

48. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the United States had dismantled about 60 per cent of its nuclear weapons. The American taxpayer had already provided over $5 billion towards the cost of nuclear disarmament programmes in the former Soviet Union, such as destroying missiles, securing fissile material, employing nuclear scientists for peaceful purposes and ending plutonium production for weapons. Moreover, since 1991, the United States had worked with its allies to reduce by 85 per cent the number of nuclear weapons within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). All those achievements were summarized in a newly issued booklet on the United States' compliance with its obligations under article VI.

49. As for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would be advising the Clinton Administration on how to respond to Senators' concerns with a view to building support for its eventual ratification. In the meantime, the United States would not resume testing and urged other nations to follow suit. It also continued to support the work of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. In conclusion, she believed that, through solidarity, nuclear disarmament could be achieved gradually, by taking such familiar and achievable steps as adopting a fissile material cut-off treaty and adhering to the course charted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

50. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

51. **Mr. Sha Zukang** (China) noted that, even in the post-cold-war period, military alliances were being strengthened; State sovereignty was violated by

"humanitarian interventions"; and, in order to enhance its strategic superiority and establish its own absolute security, a certain country had stepped up the development, deployment and proliferation of its advanced ballistic missile defence system. It was regrettable that little substantive progress had been achieved in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998). His delegation urged the two South Asian countries responsible for the nuclear explosions of 1998 to honour their commitments to refrain from conducting further nuclear tests or from impeding the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

52. China had always been firmly opposed to nuclear proliferation; it did not lend assistance to other countries for the development of nuclear weapons, or to nuclear facilities outside IAEA safeguards. In addition to abiding by the three principles of nuclear exports, it had adopted Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Exports in September 1997 and Regulations on the Control of Nuclear Dual-Use Items and Related Technology Exports in June 1999. It had joined the Zangger Committee, an international nuclear-export control system, in October 1997 and participated in the negotiations of the "Programme 93+2" protocol. In December 1998, it had also signed an Additional Protocol to its agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the application of safeguards in China.

53. At a time when advanced science and technology and the globalization process were facilitating nuclear proliferation, further efforts should be made to establish a favourable international environment, characterized by stability and the peaceful settlement of international disputes; abolish double or multi-standards in the field of non-proliferation; enhance cooperation; and discourage unilateralism. The nuclear-weapon States must faithfully implement their obligations. His delegation welcomed the recent ratification of START II by the State Duma of the Russian Federation and looked forward to its early implementation and the initiation of the START III negotiations.

54. Nuclear disarmament should be a comprehensive, irreversible and genuine process, not merely a reduction in obsolete nuclear weapons while nuclear capability was actually enhanced. Global strategic balance and strict compliance with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 were prerequisites for global nuclear disarmament. In 1999, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Chinese President Jiang Zemin had deplored the negative impact of the so-called missile defence programme on international security and stability and urged the international community to take the necessary steps to pre-empt it. Relying on its overwhelmingly superior economic, scientific and technological strength, a certain military Power, notwithstanding its large nuclear arsenals with overkill capability, was vigorously pursuing the development of a national missile defence system, which was tantamount to a nuclear arms build-up. Such actions seriously disrupted the basis for bilateral nuclear reductions by the United States and the Russian Federation and impeded the international nuclear disarmament process.

55. China used nuclear weapons only for the purpose of self-defence, had unconditionally undertaken not to be the first to use nuclear weapons or to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States and had been one of the first States to sign the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. China would participate in nuclear arms control negotiations only if it felt secure about the global strategic balance and its own national security interests; its arms control policy would inevitably be affected by the determination of a certain country to develop a national missile defence system. While his delegation supported the conclusion of a fissile material cut-off treaty, it believed that the prevention of the weaponization of outer space was a more pressing task in view of a certain country's determination to develop a missile defence system using outer space as a base.

56. The three major disarmament issues — outer space, nuclear disarmament and the fissile material cut-off treaty — should be dealt with by the Conference on Disarmament in a reasonable and balanced manner. While certain transparency measures were necessary, not all nuclear-weapon States should be requested to take the same transparency measures at the same time. The transparency measures that countries were willing to take were directly related to their strategic security environment; the small and medium-sized nuclear countries could not be expected to take transparency measures while a super-Power rampantly intervened in other countries' internal affairs, continuously improved its first-strike nuclear capability and spared no effort to develop an advanced missile defence system.

57. For the time being, the most rational and feasible confidence-building measures that could be undertaken by nuclear-weapon States would be to refrain from being the first to use nuclear weapons or from using or threatening to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. That would help to mitigate the discrimination inherent in the current international nuclear non-proliferation regime and ultimately lay the groundwork for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. China had signed cooperation agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with 16 countries, including the Russian Federation and France. It had provided assistance to developing countries in the fields of nuclear power, nuclear medical science and the application of nuclear technology.

58. At the multilateral level, China had cooperated with IAEA in the areas of nuclear power plant construction, nuclear safety, nuclear waste management and the application of nuclear technology. It had provided extrabudgetary resources to IAEA in addition to making its payments on time and in full to the Agency's Technical Cooperation Fund. China offered training to technical personnel from developing countries, dispatched its experts to provide technical services to transregional projects and give lectures at international symposia, and played an active role in cooperation in the field of nuclear science and technology in the Asia and Pacific region.

59. His delegation advocated the further strengthening of technical assistance to developing countries, the lifting of unreasonable limits on nuclear technology transfer to developing countries and active support for the efforts of those countries to develop and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Such measures would not only promote their economic development and improve their living standards but would also prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If, however, developing countries' needs with regard to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were ignored under the pretext of nuclear non-proliferation, the nuclear non-proliferation regime would ultimately lack support. Therefore, there must be an end to double standards or multi-standards in that regard.

60. In conclusion, it mattered little whether the final document of the Conference was a single paper containing two parts, or two separate papers as long as it included an accurate evaluation of the implementation of the Treaty in the past five years and set out practical arrangements for the coming five years.

61. **Mr. Ischinger** (Germany) said that the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was the foundation of his country's non-proliferation policy and the binding legal basis for nuclear disarmament. Over the previous 30 years, the Treaty had played a key role in safeguarding international peace and continued to do so. Its indefinite extension in 1995 had further clarified the obligation of the nuclear-weapon States to pursue systematic efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally with the ultimate goal of eliminating them. Germany attached great importance to the documents adopted at the 1995 Conference, which, together with the Treaty itself, constituted a solid and indispensable basis for future work.

62. At the current Conference, all States parties must demonstrate their commitment to honour their undertakings under the Treaty. Developments over the past five years and future tasks must be evaluated on the basis of the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament agreed upon at the 1995 Conference. Since 1995, nine countries had acceded to the NPT, which meant that entire continents and regions were subject to it. Nevertheless, four countries continued to stand aloof, and no effort should be spared to ensure their accession to the Treaty.

63. The test explosions in South Asia in May 1998 had placed serious strains on the non-proliferation regime. Despite international criticism, the countries concerned continued their nuclear-weapon programmes. Given the rapid development of military medium- and long-range missile technology and the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, there was an urgent need to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In that connection, he stressed the obligation of all States parties to adopt and ratify Safeguards Agreements and to adopt safeguards under the Additional Protocol to enable the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to identify illegal nuclear activities more promptly and efficiently.

64. The implementation of the principles and objectives agreed in 1995 was anything but satisfactory. The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was of crucial importance. Germany strongly welcomed the recent approval of that Treaty by the State Duma of the

Russian Federation. The opening of long-overdue negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices was equally important. The negotiating mandate drawn up in 1995 must not be called into question, and no country should further delay the early commencement of negotiations. It was hoped that the 2000 Review Conference would send a clear signal that the paralysis gripping the Conference on Disarmament would be a thing of the past.

65. The adapted Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) provided the basis for long-term stability in Europe, which was crucial for further progress in nuclear disarmament. The bilateral progress initiated by START I must be vigorously pursued. Germany particularly welcomed the Russian Federation's recent ratification of START II and strongly hoped that formal negotiations on START III would begin soon. Individual nuclear-weapon States had announced and partly implemented significant unilateral disarmament measures relating to transparency and irreversibility. He hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would follow suit.

66. The progress towards consolidating existing and creating new nuclear-weapon-free zones was commendable since they played an important part in maintaining regional stability and peace. In that connection, the concerns expressed by States parties in the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted in 1995 had lost none of their relevance. The States members of the European Union had reached a consensus on the nuclear proliferation and disarmament challenges that lay ahead. The Union had risen to the task of strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and Germany would continue to work long and hard in that area.

67. **Mr. Yamamoto** (Japan) said that, given the increasing concern over nuclear proliferation, it was essential to ensure that the basic framework for nuclear non-proliferation was as strong as possible. Japan firmly supported the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which had made a tremendous contribution to international peace and security.

68. The achievements of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference had given the international community reason to hope that concrete measures for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament would be taken through the active and concerted efforts of all States parties to the Treaty, and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon States. That hope had been bolstered by the adoption in 1996 of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the 1997 agreement between the United States of America and the Russian Federation to effect deep reductions in their stockpiles of strategic nuclear warheads and the unilateral decisions of France and the United Kingdom to reduce their respective nuclear arsenals.

69. Recently, however, nuclear non-proliferation had been set back by the nuclear tests conducted in South Asia, the delay in the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the failure to commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and the launching of missiles by a number of States. Given those adverse trends, the 2000 Review Conference was a touchstone to determine whether the Non-Proliferation Treaty could preserve and even enhance its credibility and universality. Japan strongly reaffirmed the need for the early realization of the principles and objectives that had been decided upon at the 1995 Conference and intended to submit proposals to the States parties on a number of specific points that were essential to the full and expeditious implementation of the principles and objectives and to full compliance with the Treaty. In order to consolidate the Treaty regime, the review process should be strengthened in accordance with the decision adopted by the 1995 Conference. In the light of the failure of the Preparatory Committee to achieve satisfactory results, the Conference should consider ways of enhancing the effectiveness of that Committee's work. Japan also intended to present a specific proposal on that subject.

70. As the sole country to have suffered the devastating effects of atomic bombings, Japan's policy of promoting nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation had been motivated originally by the harsh experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Its commitment to the Treaty, which was the basis of Japan's national security, enjoyed the overwhelming support of the Japanese people. The fact that, every year since 1994, the General Assembly had adopted a resolution calling for nuclear disarmament demonstrated that the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons had been accepted around the globe as a common goal of humankind.

71. The nuclear tests recently conducted by India and Pakistan had awakened the world to the reality that nuclear proliferation had reached a new and dangerous stage. Those tests had not only altered the security landscape in South Asia but also posed a grave threat to a Treaty regime that had been a cornerstone of international security for the previous 30 years. The tests could not be condoned and underscored the need for a redoubling of global efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. States parties to the Treaty should call upon those States that had not yet acceded to it to do so at the earliest possible date. It was also important to ensure that all States parties fully complied with the Treaty's provisions by accepting the full-scope IAEA safeguards in all respects and increasing the universality of the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements.

72. It was only natural, however, that those States that had abandoned forever the option of possessing nuclear weapons should demand that nuclear-weapon States make more vigorous disarmament efforts. Japan recognized the difficulty of pursuing disarmament while maintaining strategic stability in a dramatically changing security environment. Nevertheless, given their special responsibilities, nuclear-weapon States should take a number of measures. The recent ratification by the Russian Federation of the START II Treaty was an encouraging step, and the United States should commence negotiations on START III at the earliest possible date while working towards the full implementation of START II. The unilateral reductions in the nuclear arsenals of France and the United Kingdom were also welcome and should be made irreversible. Lastly, as long as nuclear disarmament by the United States and the Russian Federation continued, the other nuclear-weapon States should further reduce or at least refrain from building up their nuclear arsenals.

73. Japan had sent high-level missions to those States that had not yet signed or ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in an attempt to persuade them to do so as early as possible. It had also urged like-minded States to undertake similar initiatives. Global efforts in that area had been rewarded by the recent ratification of the Treaty by Bangladesh, Chile, Lithuania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey. In addition, the State Duma of the Russian Federation had adopted the previous week a bill for the ratification of the Treaty. Regrettably, key countries, including the United States of America and China, had not yet ratified it. Japan called for a continued moratorium on nuclear tests pending the entry into force of the Treaty.

74. It was also a matter of regret that, despite the agreement of the 1995 Review Conference, little prospect existed for the start of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off convention, which was expected to become an important pillar of the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. The States concerned should show maximum flexibility and a spirit of compromise so that negotiations could begin without further delay. Japan also hoped that all nuclear-weapon States and States that had not accepted full-scope IAEA safeguards would observe a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. The Japanese Government had promoted the development and use of nuclear energy in order to secure a stable energy supply and to reduce the level of greenhouse gas emissions. In so doing, it had committed itself to maintaining as far as possible transparency in its nuclear-fuel cycle policy and, in particular, its use of plutonium.

75. International cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy should be further expanded and the international non-proliferation regime strengthened. It was therefore a matter of regret that only eight countries, including Japan, had thus far ratified the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements. Work must be accelerated to integrate the strengthened safeguards under the Additional Protocol into the current safeguards under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and tangible steps, such as the elaboration of an international action plan, should be taken to promote universal acceptance of the Additional Protocol. As the new century dawned, Japan remained firmly committed to its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan. It would continue to contribute to world peace and prosperity by working relentlessly for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation with the ultimate goal of achieving a world free of nuclear weapons.

76. **Mr. Robson** (New Zealand) said that, despite the lack of progress to date, New Zealand was committed to pursuing in good faith and bringing to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control. It had been a very active participant in international

efforts to consolidate peace and had been proud to take its place among the peacemakers. Nations must take advantage of the opportunities that were available to prevent a new nuclear arms race, work for disarmament and secure the peace. He commended those States that had turned back from the nuclear path and taken instead the path to national and regional security as non-nuclear-weapon States. His was a vision of a southern hemisphere free of nuclear weapons that consolidated the achievements of members of existing regional nuclear-weapon-free zones and built on the initiatives of other Governments.

77. Even though it had not yet entered into force, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was a major achievement for multilateral disarmament. New Zealand gave practical support to the Treaty through the stations that it contributed to the International Monitoring System. It welcomed the recent decision by the State Duma of the Russian Federation to ratify START II, the initiative on fissile materials that had been taken by the United States, the Russian Federation and IAEA, the reduction by the United Kingdom of its nuclear arsenal, the dismantling by France of its nuclear test facilities in the South Pacific and China's continued policy of no first use of nuclear weapons. In addition, the IAEA safeguards provided in the Additional Protocol offered a new benchmark for verifying that non-nuclear-weapon States were keeping their part of the Non-Proliferation Treaty bargain.

78. There were, however, many gaps and negatives in some of those achievements. Among them were the lack of progress towards a fissile material cut-off treaty and towards the introduction of negative security assurances; continuing concerns that a few non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty were not fulfilling their obligations thereunder; nuclear doctrines that were still embedded among nuclear-weapon States and gaining new currency with the so-called re-rationalization of nuclear weapons; the failure of the United States Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, despite the positive commitment of the President and his Administration, and the fact that some countries had not yet signed and many had not yet ratified the Treaty; and, lastly, concerns over the ageing of nuclear stockpiles and over current modernization programmes.

79. While the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan were not in breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they flew in the face of the commitments made by the States parties thereto. New Zealand did not agree with the proposal that the Treaty should be adjusted to the so-called new realities and the international non-proliferation regime organized around those who challenged its norms. It was also a matter of real concern that another State not party to the Treaty, namely, Israel, operated facilities that were not subject to safeguards. New Zealand supported the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Conference and hoped that the current Conference would give a clear message that the Resolution should be fully implemented. Those States that had chosen the nuclear option would discover that it harmed their security and that they had embarked upon a very dangerous road. Others had seen and understood that and had turned back.

80. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was fundamental to non-proliferation and to disarmament, and States parties had made commitments to each other in their own vital interests, both national and collective. Those interests could be advanced by completing the work in progress, including reinforcement of the norm established under the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, adoption of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreements, launching negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty and encouraging States that were not parties to accede to the Treaty.

81. The spectre of failure indicated the distance still to travel from a history of war to a culture of peace. That gap did not lie in the performance of the 182 non-nuclear-weapon States that were parties to the Treaty, nearly all of which were meeting their commitments in full. Nor was it explained by the actions and ambiguities of the few States that were not parties to the Treaty, despite their attempts to challenge the foundations of the Treaty's success. The core concern was the absence of enough evidence of success in the key component of the Treaty, namely, disarmament. Other causes of concern were the fact that the nuclear-weapon States, which were under obligation to eliminate their arsenals, sounded too tentative when describing it as an "ultimate" goal; claims that nuclear weapons were required for security into the "indefinite" future; the new pressures being placed on the machinery for the management of nuclear weapons and materials; the increasing difficulty encountered in attempting to gain wide support for new measures to underpin collective security; and the fact that breaches of the Treaty could not be stopped.

82. The 2000 Review Conference should provide the occasion for all States parties to renew their determination to meet their Treaty commitments. The indefinite extension that States parties had supported in 1995 was not a permit for the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons. In order to finish the job, the five nuclear-weapon States should give an unequivocal commitment to the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. The bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process should also move ahead with all five nuclear-weapon States joining a process aimed at the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

83. **Mr. Hain** (United Kingdom) said that, as a nuclear-weapon State which fully complied with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, his country wanted to see the Conference take a further step forward to curb the current threat of a new nuclear arms race and pursue the ultimate objective of a nuclear-free world. The United Kingdom fully supported the statement made on behalf of the European Union, particularly with regard to the crucial subjects of universality, non-proliferation, peaceful uses and disarmament. The current Labour Government had transformed his country's role in the nuclear disarmament process, having made an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and taken significant practical steps in that regard.

84. He very much welcomed the Russian State Duma's decision to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and looked forward to its early formal ratification by the Russian Federation. India and Pakistan, however, had exploded nuclear devices and, along with North Korea, had still not signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). That was extremely disappointing and he urged all three States to sign and ratify that Treaty without further delay. Similarly, the United States Senate's vote not to ratify the CTBT against the President's advice was a disappointment. His country would continue to press for ratification by the United States as soon as possible, together with that of China, Israel and all other States that had signed the Treaty, but whose ratification was still necessary for its entry into force. Efforts must also continue to establish the verification system to ensure that the CTBT was fully operational in time.

85. The United Kingdom had pressed constantly for the immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations for a fissile material cut-off treaty and was deeply frustrated that the position of other States had thwarted the achievement of that objective. Nuclear disarmament would simply not be possible without the verification arrangements on reprocessing and enrichment facilities under such a treaty. Accordingly, he urged all States that were members of the Conference on Disarmament to set aside their differences and begin negotiations at once.

86. The United Kingdom had been making systematic and progressive efforts to reduce nuclear weapons globally. The United States of America and the Russian Federation had been making very significant reductions under the START I Treaty, had made considerable progress on issues relating to fissile material, and had successfully pursued the negotiations leading to the conclusion of a START II Protocol and various ABM Treaty-related agreements. His country was delighted that the Russian Duma and Federation Council had approved the START II Treaty and hoped that that would open the way for negotiations on a START III treaty for further cuts in nuclear arsenals.

87. Consideration of a national missile defence system by the United States had been prompted by growing concerns about the acquisition of long-range ballistic missile capabilities by some countries that did not form part of established deterrence relationships. Those concerns needed to be addressed. Nevertheless, active missile defence raised complex and difficult issues. His delegation welcomed the fact that the United States had made it clear that in taking decisions on such a system, it would take into account a number of important considerations, including the need to preserve strategic stability. Those matters should be addressed bilaterally with the Russian Federation through calm, measured dialogue. For that reason, the United Kingdom had welcomed the announcement in June 1999 that those two countries would begin discussions on a third Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START III) and on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABMT). Despite the obvious differences, it was hoped that agreement could be reached.

88. The United Kingdom had been very active in working to achieve the global elimination of nuclear weapons. It had signed and ratified the CTBT and had worked hard to establish the Treaty's verification system. His country had pressed hard for negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and had ensured that its enrichment and reprocessing operations were under EURATOM safeguards and subject to IAEA inspection.

The United Kingdom had also explicitly stated that, when it was satisfied with progress towards the global elimination of nuclear weapons, it would ensure that British nuclear weapons were included in negotiations.

89. His country had also been reducing its nuclear forces by dismantling all its air-delivered nuclear weapons, relying on a submarine-based delivery system only. Work had also begun to develop expertise in verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, and a paper on those issues was being circulated. The United Kingdom had published an initial report on past production of fissile material for defence purposes and was circulating a summary paper on its main conclusions and the role of such work in nuclear disarmament. His Government had been transparent about the size of its nuclear material stocks and had declared nuclear material excess to its defence requirements.

90. In spite of the progress made in disarmament since the end of the cold war, in some ways the planet had become even more dangerous. States such as Iraq had acquired or were seeking to acquire weapons of mass destruction. India and Pakistan continued to develop their nuclear capabilities. Israel's potential nuclear capabilities were seen by non-nuclear States in the region as a factor in the Middle East peace process. There was almost universal agreement on the need for a united and vigorous response to tackle the problems of global insecurity and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Non-Proliferation Treaty must remain the cornerstone of collective efforts to bring that about.

91. **Mr. Wibisono** (Indonesia), speaking on behalf of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, said that the Movement's position was based on the decisions taken at the 1995 Review Conference. He introduced a working paper submitted by the members of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries that were parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which addressed the issues set forth in the preamble and articles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and made specific proposals. The paper expressed the belief that the Treaty was a key instrument for halting proliferation and seeking a fair balance between the obligations and responsibilities of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States and proposed the establishment of an open-ended inter-sessional standing committee to follow up on recommendations for implementing the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

92. The working paper called for strict observance of the Treaty to stem further proliferation and reaffirmed the commitment of the non-aligned countries to its full implementation, expressing concern about the availability of nuclear technology to States that were not parties to the Treaty. The Movement called upon the parties concerned to refrain from nuclear sharing for military purposes under any kind of security arrangements. The paper confirmed the role of IAEA as the competent authority to verify compliance with obligations under the Treaty and urged States to place their nuclear facilities under the Agency's safeguards.

93. The Movement reaffirmed the inalienable right of States parties to engage in research, production and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and called for the removal of unilaterally enforced restrictive measures beyond safeguards which prevented peaceful nuclear development. The paper emphasized the need to take into account all the provisions of the CTBT and refrain from conducting all types of tests. Citing the dangers posed by nuclear armaments to mankind, the Movement called for a reversal of the nuclear arms race and the complete elimination of nuclear arsenals. The Movement was also concerned over the negative implications of the development of anti-ballistic missile defence systems and the weaponization of outer space and called for compliance with the provisions of the ABM Treaty. The paper expressed support for the efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and emphasized the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's universality.

94. On the question of security assurances, the Movement urged States to negotiate a legal instrument to protect non-nuclear States against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons and expressed the view that the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" was an integral part of the package that had been adopted. The Movement was committed to its full implementation, including the early establishment in the Middle East of a zone free of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, he called upon the other States parties to consider carefully those proposals and demonstrate the same flexibility that the Non-Aligned Movement had shown in its preparations for the review conference.

Organization of work

95. **The President** said he took it that the Conference wished to adopt the proposed programme of work set out in document NPT/CONF.2000/INF.2.

96. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2000/SR.3

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

16 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 3rd meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 April 2000, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. **Baali**	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. **Alemán** (Vice-President)	(Ecuador)
later:	Mr. **Baali** (President)	(Algeria)

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General debate *(continued)*

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00-40394 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.05 a.m.

General debate *(continued)*

1. Mr. **De Ruyt** (Belgium) said that his delegation shared the deep concern expressed by Portugal on behalf of the European Union and by many other States parties. When the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) had been concluded some 30 years earlier, the ultimate goal had been total nuclear disarmament. At the time of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty there had been legitimate reasons to hope that that goal could be achieved. The end of the cold war, permitting bilateral arms reductions, and the development of nuclear-weapon-free zones had convinced the parties to the Treaty to extend it indefinitely.

2. After the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, there had been further promising developments. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been concluded; the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II) had been ratified by the United States Senate; additional States had acceded to the NPT; and a nuclear-weapon-free zone had been established in Africa.

3. Unfortunately, hopes had recently been dashed by the emergence of some serious threats. The decision of India and Pakistan to pursue their nuclear programmes challenged the very spirit of the non-proliferation regime. While the declared intentions of India and Pakistan concerning the CTBT were good, it was time that the two countries put their words into action by acceding to it and by declaring a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and participating in the negotiation of a treaty on the matter. Also of concern was the development in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of nuclear programmes prohibited by the NPT.

4. The unexpectedly slow rate of ratification of the CTBT was disappointing. His delegation hoped that the other nuclear-weapon States would shortly follow the example of the United Kingdom, France and the Russian Federation and that the Japanese efforts in informal consultations would be successful. A further cause for concern was the inability of the international community to open negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Insistence on linking the negotiations to other matters, however understandable, was counterproductive.

5. A further worrisome development was the threat to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) posed by the declared intention of the United States to deploy a national missile defence system. It was essential that the programme should not compromise existing strategic balances or prevent the reduction of the strategic arsenals of the nuclear Powers.

6. Despite the grim picture, there had been some positive developments in the previous five years, including: the establishment of an international surveillance system in Vienna; a substantial reduction in deployed nuclear arms; an initiative by the United States and the Russian Federation to put designated fissile materials no longer required for defence purposes under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); initiatives by the United Kingdom and France regarding reductions, increased transparency and a unilateral moratorium with respect to the production of fissile materials for military purposes; the adoption of a Model Additional Protocol designed to strengthen IAEA safeguards agreements; important efforts by the NPT Exporters' Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group to enhance the transparency of export control regimes on nuclear items; and the recent ratification of START II by the Russian Parliament. His delegation hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation would shortly begin to negotiate START III.

7. It was important that the four States that remained outside the NPT should be present at meetings held to discuss the non-proliferation regime. The Malaysian suggestion was appreciated, but the proposed consultation mechanism might be too cumbersome. Perhaps the President could be given a mandate to engage in informal consultations with those countries and to report at least once annually on his efforts.

8. His delegation believed in the gradual evolution of nuclear disarmament and advocated the creation of an information exchange mechanism to allow nuclear-weapon States to keep the international community informed about efforts and progress in disarmament. The Government of Belgium had confidence in the existing structures and recognized the usefulness of the Conference on Disarmament, of which it would be assuming the Presidency. As President, its chief

priority would be to resume the activities of the Conference, which had been paralysed by a lack of consensus on the programme of work. Reasonable objectives for the next session of the Conference on Disarmament were to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for military purposes, revive the working group on negative security assurances and elaborate mandates enabling the Conference on Disarmament to deal adequately with the problems of nuclear disarmament and prevention of an arms race in outer space.

9. **Mr. Downer** (Australia) said that the value of the NPT had been demonstrated by the growth of its membership. Ten years earlier some 60 States, including two nuclear-weapon States, had been outside the Treaty. That number had dropped to four: Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan. Moreover, a number of States had turned away from possession of nuclear weapons and had acceded to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States. The Treaty enabled States to participate in nuclear trade and cooperation for peaceful purposes without fear of compromising non-proliferation objectives. It was a measure of the Treaty's success that the spread of nuclear weapons to 25 States, as projected in the 1960s, had not come to pass.

10. In honour of ANZAC Day, on which Australians remembered those who had lost their lives fighting for a better world, he wished to announce his Government's Six-Point Plan to promote progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament: the immediate entry into force and full implementation of START II and the early commencement and completion of negotiations on START III; the early entry into force of the CTBT; immediate commencement of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty and a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; universal adoption of the IAEA additional protocol and early establishment of an integrated safeguards regime; effective export controls on nuclear trade; and universal accession to the non-proliferation treaty regime.

11. Nuclear disarmament was a central obligation of the Treaty and remained a key Australian policy objective. Good progress had undoubtedly been made towards nuclear disarmament, even if not entirely uniform or consistent. The primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament lay with the two largest nuclear-weapon States. His Government looked to the United States and the Russian Federation to deliver the deep cuts in nuclear arsenals promised by the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process and encouraged them to continue their preliminary discussions on START III. The smaller nuclear-weapon States had also contributed through withdrawal from deployment and reduction of forces. All five nuclear-weapon States had supported negotiations on a treaty to ban the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and four of them had announced a moratorium on the production of such material. His Government was committed to working towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, but it was well aware that reductions must be made incrementally, by means of a realistic, balanced approach that took into account strategic realities.

12. It was worth recalling that article VI obligations were directed to all parties to the Treaty. It was important for non-nuclear-weapons States to reinforce non-proliferation and disarmament goals, for example, by encouraging the entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty. Australia had been a strong supporter of both those objectives. All States gained a vital security benefit from the assurance that others in their region were not pursuing nuclear weapons programmes. Universal accession to the Treaty remained an urgent priority. From both non-proliferation and disarmament standpoints, parties to the Treaty must adhere fully to the IAEA safeguards obligations. Australia had been an active proponent of the IAEA strengthened safeguards system and had been the first country to ratify the Additional Protocol to improve and extend IAEA inspection and access rights. His delegation urged the Conference to support the Additional Protocol strongly and pave the way for it to be regarded as a necessary part of non-nuclear-weapons States' safeguards obligations under the Treaty.

13. Although the CTBT had not entered into force, it had been firmly established as a powerful international norm against further nuclear testing. With 155 signatories, it was approaching the status of a universal treaty. The recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT was welcome. All five nuclear-weapons States had signed the CTBT and therefore had an obligation under international law not to frustrate its purpose. His Government welcomed the nuclear-weapons States' moratorium on testing and would continue to encourage the United States Administration

to mobilize popular support for the CTBT in order to convince the Senate of its worth.

14. His delegation looked to the Conference on Disarmament for the immediate commencement and speedy conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, one of the most urgent non-proliferation steps the international community could take. Pending negotiation, it hoped that China would join in the moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and that India, Israel and Pakistan would do likewise.

15. His delegation welcomed the opening for signature of treaties to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in South-East Asia and Africa similar to those in the South Pacific and in Latin America and the Caribbean. It looked forward to further progress on establishing such a zone in Central Asia.

16. The provisions of article IV of the NPT, which dealt with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, were essential to the balance of rights and obligations of States parties. Implementation had been large-scale and effective through IAEA and regional cooperation arrangements. But such cooperation required a climate of certainty about non-proliferation. Nuclear-export controls were an essential means of ensuring that non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty were met. For the vast majority of States parties, export controls were a help rather than a hindrance. His Government had long held to the principle that significant nuclear supply to non-nuclear-weapons States should be dependent on their acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards, a principle that was endorsed in the "Principles and Objectives" adopted at the 1995 Conference. It believed that accession to the IAEA Additional Protocol should also be made a condition of supply.

17. While the nuclear tests in South Asia in 1998 were a challenge to the non-proliferation regime, actions by non-parties could not be seen as a failure of the Treaty itself. His delegation urged India and Pakistan to take prompt action and to reduce tension in the region by signing the CTBT, participating in negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty, maintaining their moratoriums on nuclear tests and applying stringent export controls. Its hope was that India and Pakistan would ultimately sign the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States.

18. In examining progress on implementation of the Treaty, it would be necessary to address issues of compliance. IAEA was still unable to resume its verification and monitoring activities in Iraq. Despite recent improvements in relations with other countries in the Asia-Pacific region, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was not fulfilling all its obligations under the safeguards agreement; it must preserve the information necessary for IAEA to verify its initial inventory declaration in order to be able to benefit fully from the peaceful nuclear cooperation offered through the light-water reactor project.

19. Despite challenges, the Treaty remained the world's best defence against the spread of nuclear weapons. It was the only global treaty dedicated to the containment of nuclear weapons and their eventual elimination, and it delivered major security benefits to all States.

20. **Mr. Amorim** (Brazil) said that Brazil was participating for the first time in a review conference of parties to the Treaty. Like many others Brazil had been critical of the asymmetrical obligations deriving from the Treaty, all the more so as the essential bargain it contained had not been respected during the cold war era, when the nuclear-weapon States had increased their killing capacity. In the 1990s, however, a turning point had been reached and reductions in nuclear arsenals had become a real possibility. Brazil had also been encouraged by the decisions adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which ensured that the nuclear-weapon States would be more accountable for achieving total elimination of nuclear weapons.

21. Meanwhile, important developments had been taking place in Brazil and Latin America. Brazil's 1988 Constitution had stipulated that nuclear energy would be used in the territory for peaceful purposes only. A full-scope safeguards agreement with Argentina had been concluded, providing for control by a bilateral agency and IAEA. The Treaty of Tlatelolco had gone into force in Brazil and the other countries of the region. In view of the auspicious international trends, Brazil had decided to accede to the NPT on the understanding that effective measures would be taken towards the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

22. Unfortunately, the current international environment was less favourable than in the post-cold-war era, despite the recent encouraging decision of the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT.

The geopolitical situation appeared less stable, regional tensions had added to the complexities of global balance, and the deployment of new weapons systems and modernization of existing ones seemed to indicate that the illusion of absolute security was once again being pursued. The irreversibility of nuclear arms control measures could not be taken for granted.

23. His delegation was disturbed that thousands of nuclear weapons continued to be kept on hair-trigger alert. Rationales for the possession and use of nuclear weapons had been reinforced. Deterrence doctrines had been expanded to deal with threats of all kinds, rather than purely the survival of the State, and the threshold for use of nuclear weapons had been lowered. Continued reliance on nuclear deterrence and the assumption that nuclear weapons would be maintained indefinitely was unacceptable. The nuclear-weapon States insisted that their weapons provided security benefits but reserved to themselves alone the right to own them, a position that was discriminatory and unsustainable. The possession of nuclear weapons by any State was a constant stimulus to other States to acquire them. The nuclear tests in South Asia should have alerted the international community to the risks posed by nuclear proliferation and delayed action on nuclear disarmament. There were also worrisome signs of the gradual acceptance of the de facto nuclear status of States not yet parties to the Treaty which had failed to renounce the nuclear weapons option. Such an attitude ran counter to the spirit of the Treaty. The Conference therefore had a twofold task: to urge non-States parties to accede to the Treaty without conditions and without delay, and to call on States parties to refrain from any action that might frustrate fulfilment of the objectives of the Treaty.

24. The Conference faced daunting challenges and its deliberations would be closely followed by decision makers around the world. Its outcome would have a strong bearing on the future of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The Conference must build on the numerous contributions which Governments, experts, individuals and non-governmental organizations had put forward over the years, particularly on interim measures and subsequent steps to be taken in the area of nuclear disarmament.

25. The New Agenda Coalition, of which his country was a founding member, had been a catalyst for those ideas. It proposed a programme of action that did not exempt any country from its responsibilities towards others. The measures listed would be incumbent on the entire international community, including the five nuclear weapon States and the three States not yet parties to the Treaty. The ideas of the New Agenda Coalition were not in themselves novel. What set the New Agenda apart was its composition, timing and comprehensive, balanced and achievable programme of action.

26. In his view, the main guiding principle of the Conference should be to preserve and consolidate what had been achieved in 1995. He hoped that, given the enormous challenges facing the Conference, States would demonstrate greater flexibility and a deeper sense of responsibility in order to uphold the integrity of the Treaty and confirm its vitality by agreeing to concrete measures in the field of nuclear disarmament.

27. **Mr. Saudargas** (Lithuania) said that the Preparatory Committee's work had been less productive than had been hoped; however, a new instrument such as the strengthened review process needed time to develop and could be modified at the end of the first cycle if necessary. Despite problems of implementation and enforcement, the Treaty's fundamental purposes remained credible. His Government therefore supported those who had called for a revitalization of the review process aimed at preserving the integrity of the 1995 decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament", developing a mechanism to transform principles and objectives into action and extending the review process from three to four sessions.

28. While welcoming the accession of nine additional States to the Treaty since 1995, he urged four States which were not parties to accede thereto. He was pleased that the Russian Federation had ratified START II and hoped that that agreement would be implemented in a timely manner and that negotiations on START III would soon begin. He also commended the Governments of France and the United Kingdom for having taken unilateral measures to downsize their nuclear arsenals and the measures taken by some nuclear weapon States to increase transparency in the field of nuclear disarmament.

29. The momentum resulting from the 1999 Vienna Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty must not be lost. He therefore welcomed the recent ratification of that Treaty by the Russian Parliament and urged other

States whose ratification was required for its entry into force, especially India, Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, to sign and ratify it without delay. He also hoped that the Review Conference would promote the initiation of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty in the near future.

30. It was disturbing that, rather than working towards disarmament, States parties were increasingly required to devote their efforts to stemming proliferation. The Review Conference should therefore evaluate the dangerous course of events in the South Asian sub-continent and consider ways of preventing further deterioration in that situation. His Government was in favour of a progressive reduction of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and of enhanced efforts to close some nuclear weapon facilities, dismantle and destroy weapon-related materials, place excess nuclear materials under IAEA safeguards and pursue transparency and openness. The Conference on Disarmament should set up an appropriate mechanism to consider nuclear disarmament issues.

31. He welcomed efforts to expand nuclear-weapon-free zones through, *inter alia*, the Treaties of Rarotonga, Tlatelolco, Pelindaba and Bangkok and hoped that similar zones would be established in Central Asia and the Middle East. In that regard, he welcomed the Disarmament Commission's adoption of guidelines on the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

32. While IAEA played a crucial role in the non-proliferation regime, its safeguards could not be effective unless all States parties honoured their commitments. His Government had acceded to virtually all IAEA conventions in the field of nuclear energy and was working to bring its legislation on export controls into line with that of the Nuclear Supplier Group States.

33. Despite some difficulties, the Treaty had proved effective; he was certain that a compromise could be reached and new forward-looking initiatives developed and endorsed for implementation during the next review cycle.

34. **Mr. Axworthy** (Canada) said that, in the fifty years since Canada had given up its own nuclear-weapon capacity, it had spent time and resources to build a strong international nuclear non-proliferation regime. With the NPT at its centre, the regime painstakingly constructed over decades had proved its worth, yet past achievement was no guarantee of future security. The cold-war truths of the twentieth century were giving way to the shifting uncertainties of the new one.

35. The challenges facing the Conference were varied. One concern was the tendency of some to justify retaining nuclear arsenals as a defence against other weapons of mass destruction or as political status symbols. No less disturbing were the ambitions of others to acquire nuclear capacity. Nuclear testing by India and Pakistan had added a frightening dimension to the insecurity in that region and had flagrantly violated international norms against nuclear proliferation. With the dismantling of warheads came heightened concern about the possibility of illicit transfers of weapons-grade material and technology. The drift towards unilateral options was also troubling. In the United States, the rejection of the CTBT was a significant step backward, while the proposed unilateral national missile defence system would have serious implications for the NPT regime. In the meantime, the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament had precluded any movement relating to nuclear disarmament, security assurances and prevention of an arms race in outer space. At least 50 States parties to the NPT had not yet concluded nuclear safeguards agreements.

36. To be sure, there had also been promising developments since the NPT had been extended indefinitely five years earlier. The number of States remaining outside the Treaty had been reduced from 10 to 4, and the CTBT had been signed by the vast majority of States. Nuclear weapon-free zones had been established. IAEA had adopted measures that significantly strengthened the nuclear safeguards regime. Significant reductions in nuclear weapons and the elimination of entire weapons systems by the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and France, as well as deep cuts in the nuclear forces assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), had contributed to a more stable security environment. In addition, the Russian Federation had decided to ratify START II and the CTBT.

37. While the record of the past five years might be mixed, it was clear that the end of the cold war had not removed the threat of nuclear weapons. Before the global nuclear non-proliferation regime could wither

by active design or malign neglect, it was essential to reaffirm international commitment and refocus global energy on strengthening the regime, as the best guarantee of common security.

38. Canada's goal was to give new meaning to the foundation of the NPT: a promise by those without nuclear weapons not to acquire them, in exchange for a commitment by those possessing such weapons to give them up eventually. The pledge made when the NPT had been extended indefinitely had been to ensure permanence with accountability. Canada's approach to that goal was threefold. First, it was committed to promoting and protecting the universality of the Treaty. Second, it would work to secure agreement on an updated five-year disarmament and non-proliferation action plan containing concrete objectives and goals. The action programme should be designed to find a way to bring the CTBT into force as soon as possible, end the deadlock in the Conference on Disarmament and begin negotiations on a ban on fissile material production, continue START reductions in strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, stress the need for the integrity of the ABM Treaty to be maintained, call on all nuclear-weapon States to enter into disarmament negotiations once the United States and the Russian Federation had reduced their strategic warheads to the 1000-2000 range, extend the application of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and encourage new ones, promote the universalization of IAEA safeguards, and further improve verification and inspection capacity and effectiveness. Another matter to be addressed was the growing number of countries which were developing or acquiring missiles capable of delivering nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Yet no treaty, code of conduct or set of guidelines existed to define responsible behaviour in those areas. The Missile Technology Control Regime could be made more effective by adopting stricter export controls on relevant technology and widening participation.

39. Third, Canada would work towards a more robust NPT review and assessment process through more frequent tracking, discussion and documentation of the progress made in translating commitment into action. Real accountability also required real transparency, and the active contribution of representatives of non-governmental organizations could do a great deal to enhance the openness of the Conference's work and mobilize public support and participation in its efforts.

40. The first resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly had been one recommending that atomic weapons should be eliminated from national arsenals. Ever since then, the international community had grappled with how best to contain the nuclear genie. Imperfect as it might be, the global nuclear non-proliferation regime provided the answer. A strong and effective NPT remained indispensable. The NPT remained the most widely adhered-to security accord in history because, despite the frustrations, it offered the best hope for minimizing the threat of nuclear annihilation, and the best vehicle for advancing common security.

41. **Mr. Ivanov** (Russian Federation), after conveying the greetings of President Putin and his best wishes for the success of the Conference, said it was symbolic that the review of the NPT was being held at the turn of the new century, when the foundations for a new system of international relations were being laid. His delegation had come to the Conference with the strong conviction that the preservation and strengthening of the Treaty would serve the interests of the entire world community.

42. New threats to international security and stability had emerged in the form of local conflicts, international terrorism and militant separatism. A tendency to undermine the existing system of strategic stability, attempts to build national stability at the expense of the interests of other States and the use of force in violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law were equally dangerous and in fact were a direct invitation to a new arms race. In short, the world had come to a crossroads: either it would preserve through joint efforts the positive achievements in non-proliferation and limitation of nuclear weapons, or it would face the real prospect of chaos and uncontrollable military power. It was extremely important, therefore, that efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation regime should be made an integral part of a fair and democratic world order based on mutual trust and equal security for all States and regions.

43. The Russian Federation was fully committed to its obligations under article VI of the NPT. It was resolved to encourage steady progress by all five nuclear Powers towards nuclear disarmament. A few days earlier, it had ratified START II and the 1997 package of anti-ballistic missile agreements. The implementation of those instruments would constitute a

major step towards nuclear disarmament by reducing the overall level of strategic offensive weapons in Russia and the United States by approximately two thirds as compared to 1990 levels. It had also decided to ratify the CTBT.

44. The Russian Federation continued to implement earlier agreements on the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals. Pursuant to START I, it had already eliminated more than 2,000 ballistic missiles and over 950 land- and sea-based launchers, some 30 nuclear submarines and more than 80 heavy bombers. Total reductions under START I, when completed, would amount to some 40 per cent of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia and the United States.

45. Furthermore, all Russian ballistic missiles had been de-targeted. His Government continued to implement unilateral initiatives related to tactical nuclear weapons, removing them from surface ships, multi-purpose submarines, and land-based naval aircraft. Destruction of nuclear warheads from tactical missiles, artillery shells and mines was about to be completed, and half the nuclear warheads for anti-aircraft missiles and for nuclear-gravity bombs had been destroyed. The Russian Federation was prepared to go further by considering steps to reduce the nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia to the level of 1,500 warheads each. That historic opportunity could be missed, however, if the United States plan to deploy a national ABM system, in violation of the ABM Treaty of 1972, was translated into action.

46. Further reductions in strategic offensive weapons could be considered only in the context of preservation of the ABM Treaty. That instrument had opened the way for deep reductions in strategic offensive weapons on a stable and transparent basis. The prevailing system of arms control agreements was a complex and fragile structure, and, once one of its key elements had been weakened, the entire system would be destabilized. The collapse of the ABM Treaty would undermine all the disarmament agreements concluded over the past 30 years, and the threat of erosion of the non-proliferation regime would grow.

47. Compliance with the ABM Treaty in its current form, without any modifications, was a prerequisite for further negotiations on nuclear disarmament in accordance with article VI of the NPT. The national security interests of every State and of the international community as a whole were affected. His Government was convinced that missile threats and proliferation could and should be dealt with without violating the ABM Treaty, and it was prepared to engage in the broadest possible consultations on the subject, both with the United States and multilaterally. It had proposed the establishment of a global missile and missile technologies non-proliferation control system as a real alternative to the vitiation of the ABM Treaty. The choice of that option was crucial not only to the fate of the non-proliferation regime, but also to the favourable unfolding of international affairs.

48. The task of strengthening the NPT was beyond the scope of the nuclear Powers alone. The universality of the Treaty remained an urgent concern, and those States which had not yet signed it should be actively encouraged to do so. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones made a meaningful contribution to the development and consolidation of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Russia was a party to the majority of international agreements on such zones, and the fact that it had no nuclear weapons beyond its national territory also illustrated its contribution to the consolidation of that regime. It urged other nuclear Powers to follow its example.

49. A ban on the production of fissile materials was another urgent issue. Russia was decommissioning its last remaining facilities for the production of weapons-grade plutonium and had ceased such production several years earlier. His delegation would work actively towards negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on that issue.

50. The future of the Conference on Disarmament was in grave doubt because of an erosion in the atmosphere of compromise which had prevailed earlier in that forum and the desire of some States to establish linkages between issues. For the second year in a row, the Conference was simply marking time, and a choice must be made to renounce immediate advantage in the interests of the common cause.

51. The NPT created a favourable climate for growing international cooperation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. The IAEA safeguards were an effective instrument for strengthening the non-proliferation regime and a powerful confidence-building measure. Thirty years earlier, by concluding the Treaty, the international community had rejected the nuclear arms race. Confirmation of its indefinite extension by the Conference would vividly

demonstrate the commitment to make non-proliferation one of the inviolable principles of international security in the twenty-first century.

52. **Mr. Chalyi** (Ukraine) said that his Government had long supported the ideas embodied in General Assembly resolution 54/54 G, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda". The voluntary renunciation of nuclear weapons by Ukraine and other newly independent States after the collapse of the Soviet Union was an act of great moral significance and political courage that should be properly reflected in the final document of the Conference.

53. Although Ukraine had possessed the world's third greatest nuclear potential, it had acceded to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State in 1994. It had eliminated 77 per cent of its strategic offensive weapons under START I and planned to complete that process by the end of 2001. He therefore welcomed the Russian Federation's ratification of START II and hoped that talks on START III would soon be resumed.

54. In affirming the importance of the ABM Treaty, his Government considered that no action taken by a State party with a view to lessening the possibility of a missile attack should constitute a violation of its obligations under that instrument. It also hoped that other nuclear-weapon States would join the Russian Federation in ratifying the CTBT.

55. The fundamental principle of non-proliferation had been undermined by developments in South Asia and challenged by States not parties to the NPT. It was imperative that those States should accede thereto as non-nuclear States without delay. It was also important to begin negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament.

56. Nuclear-weapon-free zones could play a valuable role in maintaining regional and global security and should be established in the regions of Central Asia and the Middle East.

57. IAEA efforts to strengthen the safeguards regime were commendable. Since 1995, Ukraine had greatly improved its non-proliferation record; it had concluded with IAEA an agreement for the application of comprehensive safeguards in 1997 and planned to sign the additional protocol to that agreement in 2001.

58. In the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, a legally binding instrument, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, France and China had provided his Government with security guarantees that had been among the key factors in its decision to accede to the Treaty. His country's experience could be of value to the development of a universal, legally binding document on assurances. In that regard, he considered that the Ad Hoc Committee on Effective International Arrangements to Assure Non-Nuclear-Weapon States against the use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, established in 1998 by the Conference on Disarmament, should be re-established. He also welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and hoped that the Council would pursue further expansion of the application of security assurances as part of the non-proliferation review process.

59. *Mr. Alemán (Ecuador), Vice-President, took the chair.*

60. **Mr. La Fortelle** (France) said that the success of the Review Conference would require a comprehensive, balanced approach to the three key areas covered by the Treaty – non-proliferation, the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and disarmament – and that his Government was convinced that the documents adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference were of fundamental importance to the review process.

61. France had committed itself unequivocally to nuclear disarmament in accordance with the provisions of article VI of the Treaty and of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference. It had completely phased out its land-based nuclear component, reduced its airborne and sea-based components, ratified the CTBT, closed its Mururoa test site, ceased production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons, reduced the alert status of its nuclear forces on two occasions, provided the security assurances mentioned in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and ratified the relevant protocols to the treaties establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones.

62. His Government was committed to enhanced transparency as a voluntary confidence-building measure in support of disarmament efforts and, to that end, had opened its test site in the Pacific to international visits and published a document entitled "Arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation:

French policy". He commended the success of the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, recently illustrated by the Russian Federation's ratification of START II, and urged States which had not yet ratified the CTBT and, in particular, those whose ratification was necessary to its entry into force, to sign and ratify it in the near future. It was particularly unfortunate that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, the next step in the multilateral disarmament process, had not yet begun.

63. In a time of change and instability, it was essential to preserve and implement decision 2 of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. Nothing would be more dangerous than attempting to redraft the fundamental principles and objectives contained in that key document every five years. Securing the early entry into force of the CTBT and launching negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty were principles that had been recognized in a consensual manner as the only approach that would make it possible to secure the adherence by all States, whether or not they were parties to the Treaty, to universal, non-discriminatory, verifiable and hence credible standards. It would also enable States that had chosen not to accede to that instrument to demonstrate their commitment to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, thereby strengthening the Treaty itself and helping to ease regional tensions, especially in South Asia and the Middle East.

64. At a time when the risk that the arms race would be revived and the strategic balance broken was not negligible, it was indispensable for the United States of America and the Russian Federation to pursue the global reduction of their nuclear arsenals, which remained incommensurate with those of other nuclear-weapon States. His delegation therefore attached great importance to maintaining strategic stability, of which the ABM Treaty was an essential element, and was prepared to discuss new proposals for countering the slowness of the disarmament process both during the Review Conference and in the Conference on Disarmament, subject to a mandate adopted by consensus.

65. His Government was concerned at the fact that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea had repeatedly hindered IAEA efforts to secure implementation of that country's safeguards agreement by verifying that all nuclear material subject to guarantees had been declared. Iraq was also a cause for concern. Thanks to the verification programme carried out since 1991, IAEA had been able to form a coherent picture of the Iraqi clandestine nuclear programme. He therefore regretted that IAEA had been unable to fulfil its mandate in that regard since 16 December 1998 and welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and the inauguration of a process leading to the resumption of controls. France, for its part, had signed a strengthened safeguards agreement with IAEA and the European Atomic Energy Community on 22 September 1998 and would do its utmost to ratify it as quickly as possible.

66. His Government was cooperating with numerous countries and institutions in an effort to promote the widest possible access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in a climate of confidence that was contingent on security, safety and transparency. The international community required an assurance that cooperation and exchange could not give rise to diversion of materials; hence the need for effective, objective and transparent export controls and adherence to the IAEA safeguards system. He called on all States that had not yet done so to sign and ratify the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. Lastly, nuclear development must be accompanied by transparency in order to make governments and populations aware of what was at stake and to convince public opinion that nuclear power was an environmentally friendly and safe source of energy.

67. **Mr. Abusseitov** (Kazakhstan) said that the problems that had come up during the review process could lead to inconsistencies between the interpretation of Treaty obligations and the interests of States parties thereto, especially between nuclear-weapon States and others. It was therefore incumbent upon the international community to make the Treaty an effective tool for nuclear disarmament and for strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

68. It was essential for the United States of America and the Russian Federation to intensify their arms reduction talks and for them to be joined in that process by the three other nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, the recent ratification by the Russian Federation of START II paved the way for negotiations on further reductions of strategic arms as well as a package of 1997 ABM arrangements, in particular a memorandum

of understanding on the participation of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in the implementation of the ABM Treaty. At the same time, it had become clear that despite the multilateral treaties in force, the international arms control regime was very vulnerable, since even a slight change in global balance and stability could endanger the effectiveness of the international arms control regime as a whole. In that regard, his delegation was concerned over the situation with respect to the ABM Treaty, the preservation of which was an indispensable condition for the process of disarmament.

69. Recognizing the need for overall strengthening of the non-proliferation regime, his delegation supported the entry into force of the CTBT at an early date. By closing the Semipalatinsk test site, his country had made a significant contribution to the nuclear-test ban. He welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and was encouraged by the efforts of the United States Administration to resubmit the issue of ratification to the Senate. There was also a need, in the context of globalization, to strengthen efforts to combat the illegal trade in nuclear material and missile technologies. His country had nearly concluded its internal procedures for joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group and was also preparing to join the Missile Technology Control Regime.

70. It was extremely important to establish a new climate of openness and transparency in the nuclear field, especially in view of the hundreds of tons of fissile material that would be released as a result of radical reductions in the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals. Such openness would be helpful in enhancing confidence between States and ensuring that the fissile material would not be misused. His Government favoured the early commencement of negotiations on ending the production of fissile material for military purposes. It was also actively involved in the elaboration of the Treaty on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia.

71. The problem of security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States could be solved by adopting a security assurances protocol as an integral part of the NPTO. The provisions of such a protocol should be simple and unambiguous. Greater openness and unrestricted exchange of nuclear material and technologies and of scientific information should facilitate the development of programmes on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. He drew attention to the question of the rehabilitation of the former nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk. Nearly two years had passed since the adoption by the General Assembly of a resolution urging the international community to assist his Government to rehabilitate that region. A report on the subject would be submitted at the fifty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

72. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

73. **Ms. Lindh** (Sweden), endorsing the statement of the European Union and the views expressed by Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition, said that 30 years after the entry into force of the NPT, international negotiations on nuclear disarmament were nearly at a standstill. Since 1995, there had been more setbacks than progress in nuclear disarmament. Such setbacks included the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan, the violation by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea of its NPT obligations and the plans being made by the United States of America to build a national missile defence system, which might spark off a new nuclear missile race. Out of concern for that situation, Sweden, together with several other non-nuclear-weapon States, had launched an initiative in 1998 calling for progress towards the treaty-bound objective of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

74. Some positive steps had been taken by nuclear-weapon States to reduce nuclear weapons globally. They included the systematic implementation of START I ahead of schedule by the United States and the Russian Federation, the unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons by France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and efforts by some nuclear-weapon States to increase transparency in the disarmament process and to place fissile material under appropriate international safeguards.

75. However, those efforts were not enough. There were four areas of particular concern: reducing nuclear arsenals; bringing into force the CTBT; halting the development of new weapons and systems; and keeping nuclear weapons out of regional conflicts. While her delegation welcomed the ratification by the Russian Federation of START II, it remained deeply concerned that the Treaty had still not entered into force seven years after its signature. The Russian Federation and the United States of America must now exercise their special responsibility by bringing START II and its protocol into force and immediately

beginning negotiations on START III. The unilateral reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons carried out by some nuclear-weapon States should be followed by further cutbacks. There should be transparency in the stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons, which had no place in the twenty-first century. She welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and urged China, India, Pakistan, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the United States of America to follow suit.

76. No State had the right to hold the common security environment hostage to domestic policies. Nor was it acceptable that differences between the nuclear-weapon States on unrelated issues should interfere with the responsibility for making progress on the nuclear arms control agenda. The development of nuclear weapons should cease once and for all. Her Government remained committed to negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty which would effectively prevent the further development of nuclear weapons, and it could not accept attempts by China or any other State to block progress on that crucial treaty.

77. Her Government was deeply concerned about the plans by the United States for a national missile defence system. Such action might jeopardize the international balance and have negative consequences for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. States parties should refrain from any deployment that could create uncertainties. In that regard, the Russian Federation and the United States of America shared the responsibility for negotiating a solution that would have a positive impact on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

78. There was a need to halt regional nuclear threats. The nuclear-weapon testing conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 had the potential to set off an arms race that would threaten peace and security in South Asia. It was imperative that India and Pakistan should renounce their nuclear ambitions in accordance with Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) and sign the CTBT. In the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continued to be a cause for concern. Iraq should cooperate with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), and the countries of the Middle East region should take decisive steps towards a comprehensive solution to the security situation, including the setting up of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction. Her delegation hoped for a solution to the nuclear situation on the Korean peninsula and urged all the States concerned to refrain from developing weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea must abide by its safeguard commitments in accordance with article III of the NPT.

79. Her delegation welcomed the approval in 1997 of a system which would strengthen the ability of IAEA to detect secret nuclear-weapons programmes. However, the additional protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreements must be ratified more expeditiously. Illicit trafficking was a threat to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and she therefore urged States to accede to the Physical Protection Convention as soon as possible. Moreover, thought should be given to cooperative measures, including verification, which would strengthen worldwide physical protection. Her Government remained committed to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and welcomed the efforts of IAEA to align its activities in that field more closely with those of developing countries. Any activities related to nuclear applications must be based on internationally agreed safety standards, and all countries must accede to all relevant conventions and fully implement their commitments.

80. The Conference offered an opportunity for the States parties to add more substance to the strengthened review process and to renew international commitment to the full implementation of the NPT. To that end, they should undertake unequivocally to eliminate nuclear arsenals and to engage without delay in an accelerated process of negotiations, thus achieving nuclear disarmament in accordance with the NPT; to do their utmost to achieve the entry into force of the CTBT unconditionally and without delay; to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; to increase transparency in respect of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons arsenals and stocks of fissile material; and to let the principle of irreversibility guide all measures undertaken in the field of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

81. **Mr. Niehaus** (Costa Rica) condemned the use of or threat to use and the development of nuclear weapons No situation justified the existence of nuclear arsenal given the dangers that lay in the inevitable escalation of military conflict. Once the nuclear fuse was lit, there was no way of avoiding global

conflagration. The nuclear-weapon States must make a genuine commitment to disarmament, deactivate their offensive nuclear systems and dismantle their arsenals. Moreover, they should halt the transfer of nuclear technology to States that were not parties to the NPT.

82. His delegation was seriously concerned about the nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan and strongly urged all countries that were not yet parties to the NPT to renounce the development of nuclear weapons and become parties to that international instrument as soon as possible, without stipulating conditions. The universality of the NPT should be one of the primary goals of the international community with a view to guaranteeing global security. In that regard, he congratulated the seven States that had ratified the Treaty since 1995. He also appealed to all the States that had not ratified or signed the CTBT to do so shortly. That Treaty's entry into force was an indispensable and urgent step to ensure the security of all humanity. Its prompt ratification was essential to prevent a new arms race. In that regard, he welcomed the recent ratification of the CTBT and START II in the Russian Federation and expressed serious concern at the difficulties that the ratification process had encountered in other States. He was also concerned at the obstacles put in the way of IAEA by Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

83. He hoped that all those participating in the Conference would undertake to adopt concrete measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war and revive nuclear disarmament talks. The Review Conference should establish a nuclear disarmament agenda for the next five years that included: the establishment of concrete measures such as the early entry into force of the CTBT; the negotiation of a universal and legally binding instrument to prohibit the production of fissile material; the strengthening of IAEA and its verification activities; the adoption of additional protocols pursuant to article III of the NPT; and the establishment of a system to guarantee the physical protection of nuclear material.

84. The five nuclear-weapon States had prime responsibility for ensuring that the negotiations referred to in article VI of the NPT were pursued. Lastly, he wished to stress that the financial resources currently devoted to weapons should be used instead to promote socioeconomic development.

Programme of work *(continued)*

85. **The President**, after drawing attention to rule 34 of the rules of procedure, said that Mr. Christopher Weston (Canada) had been nominated Chairman of subsidiary body 2 of Main Committee II.

86. *Mr. Weston (Canada) was elected Chairman of subsidiary body 2 of Main Committee II.*

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2000/SR.4

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

17 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 4th meeting
Held at Headquarters, New York, on Tuesday, 25 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. Balboni Acqua	(Italy)
later:	Mr. Minty	(South Africa)

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Any corrections to the record of this meeting and of other meetings will be issued in a corrigendum.

00-40401 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee

1. **The President** said that, in accordance with rule 5 of the rules of procedure, the Conference would elect two Vice-Chairmen for each of the three Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee. The following nominations had been received: Mr. Lint (Belgium) for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I; Mr. Suh Dae-won (Republic of Korea) for that of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II; Mr. Dzundev (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) for the post of Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III; Ms. Aboulnaga (Egypt) for that of Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee; and Mr. Botnaru (Moldova) for the post of Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee.

2. *Mr. Lint (Belgium) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee I; Mr. Suh Dae-won (Republic of Korea) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee II; Mr. Dzundev (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) was elected Vice-Chairman of Main Committee III; Ms. Aboulnaga (Egypt) was elected Vice-Chairman of the Drafting Committee; and Mr. Botnaru (Moldova) was elected Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee.*

3. **The President** said that consultations on the outstanding nominations for the posts of Vice-Chairmen of the Committees were still continuing and that he would inform the Conference of those nominations at an appropriate time.

Election of Vice-Presidents

4. **The President** said that it was his understanding that the Conference wished to designate the delegation of Myanmar to provide one of the Vice-Presidents of the Conference.

5. *It was so decided.*

General debate (*continued*)

6. **Mr. Samhan** (United Arab Emirates) said that global political events had proved that the stability and security of States could not be achieved through the stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons not only posed a serious threat to humanity, but also had a very negative impact on economic and social development, and the environment. Despite the limited attempts by some nuclear-weapon States to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, the international community was still burdened by an arms race, particularly in prohibited weapons, including nuclear weapons. That situation had encouraged some countries in regions where tensions prevailed to conduct nuclear tests, stockpile fissile and nuclear materials, and acquire other non-conventional weapons as a means of deterrence.

7. As a result, there had been an escalation of tension and conflicts between those States, which constituted a direct threat to regional and international peace and security. His Government therefore called upon States to respect their obligations under the treaties prohibiting such weapons and urged States which had not yet done so to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in order to achieve universality. It supported the proposals to establish subregional, regional and international arrangements to safeguard non-proliferation, including the establishment of an ad hoc committee of the Conference on Disarmament, so as to achieve the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons in accordance with article VI of the Treaty and also to conclude an unconditional instrument that would provide security safeguards for non-nuclear-weapon States.

8. Since 1995, there had been some positive developments, such as the accession of nine States to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, including the United Arab Emirates. His Government had taken that step on the basis of the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" and relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions which provided a legal basis for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East region. Israel was the only country in the region which had not yet acceded to the Treaty and still possessed nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. That situation caused a clear military imbalance in the region and posed a continuous threat to regional peace and security, undermining the credibility of the Treaty. His Government urged the Conference to call upon the Israeli Government to give up its nuclear arsenal and implement the "Resolution on the Middle East" and to submit all its nuclear facilities to the inspection regime of the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It also called for an end to the provision of all forms of technological and scientific assistance in support of Israeli nuclear facilities.

9. Achieving a comprehensive and just peace in the Middle East and putting an end to occupation and tension in that region, particularly in the Arab gulf region, depended mainly on countries having the necessary political will to implement their obligations to eliminate prohibited weapons, including nuclear weapons, and to work to settle conflicts and end occupation in a peaceful manner, on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of international law, especially the principles of mutual respect for the sovereignty of regional States, peaceful coexistence, confidence-building measures, and renunciation of the use of force.

10. **Mr. Kharrazi** (Islamic Republic of Iran) said that despite the ever-growing call for nuclear disarmament, the qualitative development of nuclear weapons continued unabated and the nuclear-weapon States showed no sign of relenting. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, however, had never sought to perpetuate a permanent classification of some States as nuclear-weapon States. Since nuclear disarmament remained the ultimate goal of the Treaty, nuclear-weapon States had an international obligation to cease the manufacture of such weapons and eliminate all existing stockpiles and their means of delivery.

11. That obligation had been underlined by the International Court of Justice. The maintenance of nuclear arsenals increased the dangers of vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation and the risks of accidental or deliberate nuclear attack. Since the international community had banned the use, development and stockpiling of two categories of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear weapons should not be exempted. Work should begin on an additional protocol to the Treaty to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The time had come to start negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention; the nuclear threat was global and its removal was a legitimate international concern.

12. There was enormous potential for the further diversification and development of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The systematic refusal to transfer nuclear technology to developing non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty and the restrictive export control policies exercised by the nuclear suppliers were therefore highly regrettable. Ad hoc regimes, acting under the pretext of non-proliferation, continued to pursue discriminatory policies with the main objective of exclusive possession of nuclear technology by developed countries. That situation must be rectified. The existence of those regimes undermined the credibility of the Treaty and of IAEA, and rendered the IAEA safeguards irrelevant. The problem was compounded by certain States, with an imperfect record on non-proliferation, which had arrogated the right to determine compliance by others and to take measures to prevent access to peaceful nuclear technology by States parties to the Treaty, even though the 1995 Conference had established the requirement that States parties which had concerns regarding non-compliance with the Safeguards Agreements must direct such concerns to IAEA.

13. The Treaty constituted an integrated whole, whose effectiveness lay in full compliance with all its provisions by all States parties. Continued failure by nuclear-weapon States to live up to their side of the bargain would render the regime unstable and untenable. The current Conference must take effective measures to guarantee the implementation of article IV in all its aspects, especially with regard to the transfer of technology, equipment and nuclear materials to developing States. It should make every effort to develop common approaches and generally agreed arrangements for international peaceful nuclear trade.

14. The horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons had made security assurances all the more essential. Old bloc rivalries must be put aside. The preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the relevant Security Council resolutions and unilateral declarations by nuclear-weapon States were inadequate. Meanwhile, some nuclear-weapon States had tried to confine security assurances to nuclear-weapon-free zones or to place conditions on their obligations towards non-nuclear-weapon States. The Conference should strive to obtain more stringent and specific nuclear security assurances in the form of a legally binding international instrument. The Treaty could not be effective unless it achieved universality. Genuine and concerted efforts were required to attain that objective. The review process should provide for deliberations on ways to promote the universality of the Treaty, in particular, through the accession of States operating unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

15. The threat posed to regional and international peace and security by Israel's clandestine nuclear-weapon programmes was a major impediment to achieving the goals of the Treaty. Despite its intransigence, Israel benefited from unrestricted transfer of nuclear technology, equipment and material, and was fully catered to by the self-appointed guardians of non-proliferation. It was imperative to build on the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" and explore ways to implement it. Israel should be forced to renounce nuclear weapons, accede to the Treaty and bring all its facilities and programmes under IAEA safeguards. Those who had helped Israel to develop such weapons had a special responsibility in that regard. Since the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East" had been part of the package solution which had secured the indefinite extension of the Treaty, it was imperative to honour that collective commitment.

16. The 2000 Review Conference should also consider the implementation of the decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty". In addition to the inherent institutional shortcomings of the review mechanism, lack of political will and accommodation, as well as a selective approach towards provisions of the Treaty by some nuclear-weapon States had contributed to the failure of the review process. In order to guarantee compliance by States parties and full implementation of the decisions of the Review Conference, a standing body should be established. The Conference could set up a study group to consider establishing such a mechanism and report to the next session of the Preparatory Commission.

17. Nuclear non-proliferation was at stake; it was not a time for complacency. Apathy towards the Treaty, half-hearted commitment to its objectives and selective compliance with its provisions would undermine its relevance and validity. The Treaty must be viewed and implemented in its totality; all its provisions were interrelated and mutually reinforcing. The Islamic Republic of Iran had forgone the nuclear weapon option and would remain committed to nuclear non-proliferation.

18. **Mr. Aboul Gheit** (Egypt) said that his delegation wished to associate itself with the statements made at the second meeting by the representative of Indonesia introducing the working paper of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the representative of Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. The 2000 Review Conference was the first opportunity to review the progress made towards implementation of the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty since its indefinite extension in 1995 and towards implementation of the comprehensive package of commitments entered into by the States parties to the Treaty at the 1995 Conference. A review of those objectives would reflect more failure than success.

19. With respect to the decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", the goal of universal adherence to the Treaty had not been attained; the international community had failed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia; efforts to achieve the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) had been hindered by the refusal of the United States Senate to ratify it; and negotiations had yet to be initiated in the Conference on Disarmament on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

20. The decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty" had set ambitious goals for review conferences and preparatory committee meetings. However, the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference had failed to adopt any substantive recommendations. As to the "Resolution on the Middle East", Israel had yet to accede to the Treaty or place its nuclear facilities under full-scope International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. The 1995 Conference had reaffirmed the importance of the strict implementation of the provisions of the Treaty relating to nuclear disarmament, and emphasized the need to set specific objectives to achieve that ultimate goal. His delegation welcomed the steps taken by some nuclear-weapon States to reduce their arsenals over the past five years and noted with satisfaction the recent approval for ratification by the Russian State Duma of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II).

21. However, those steps fell short of meeting the hopes and aspirations of States that had renounced the nuclear option. In order to promote efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak had called for the convening of an international conference and the eight States of the New Agenda Coalition had issued a joint declaration urging the nuclear-weapon States to accelerate the disarmament process. In that connection his Government fully supported the proposal by the Secretary-General in his report "We the peoples: the

role of the United Nations in the twenty-first century" (A/54/2000) for the convening of a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers.

22. The absence of effective legally binding international security assurances to protect the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons was a source of disappointment. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) had failed to respond to the legitimate demands of those States. His delegation believed that it was high time to initiate negotiations on an international legally binding instrument. The decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" had reaffirmed the right of all States parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and had emphasized that, in all activities designed to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, preferential treatment should be given to the non-nuclear-weapon States party to the Treaty.

23. The decision also called for increased transparency in nuclear-related export controls. Yet the non-nuclear-weapon States continued to face obstacles in their efforts to gain access to nuclear technology and know-how. His delegation urged the elimination of all constraints that prevented the full realization by States parties of their rights under article IV of the Treaty. In that connection, it considered that States parties should be legally obliged to apply IAEA safeguards as a precondition for the transfer to them of nuclear technology or materials. Also, decisive measures must be taken to protect peaceful nations from the threat of nuclear leaks from reactors not subject to international supervision.

24. With regard to the situation in the Middle East, Egypt had put forward many proposals with a view to overcoming the current impasse, including the initiation of regional negotiations on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, the declaration by the States of the region of their commitment to adhere within a specified time-frame to the international instruments on nuclear non-proliferation and the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, and the implementation of confidence-building measures in the nuclear field. Regrettably, Israel had failed to respond to those proposals. That state of affairs could not be allowed to continue. The non-proliferation Treaty would have no credibility in the region as long as one State was exempt from its provisions.

25. The 2000 Review Conference must demand that Israel should accede to the Treaty without further delay and place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards. It must adopt clear recommendations for achieving the full implementation of the "Resolution on the Middle East". There was a need to consider the establishment of a mechanism to monitor progress in that area. His delegation believed that the nuclear-weapon States and, in particular, the States depositaries of the Treaty, as sponsors of the resolution, had a special responsibility concerning the realization of its objectives. The "Resolution on the Middle East" was an integral part of the package of commitments entered into at the 1995 Conference. Those commitments were not open to negotiation. If the situation in the Middle East was not given due regard on the pretext that to do so would burden the Conference, the credibility of the Treaty and the whole non-proliferation regime would be undermined.

26. With respect to the outcome of the Conference, he said that it was necessary to build on what had been achieved in 1995, to set new goals for the period leading up to the 2005 Conference, and to adopt recommendations for their attainment. There should be a particular focus on achieving the Treaty's universality and the strict implementation of its provisions. The participants must also consider how to improve the Preparatory Committee's working methods and how to make use of the subsidiary bodies established. Regarding the final document, the proposal to deal separately with those questions on which there was broad agreement and those issues on which consensus would be harder to obtain was unacceptable.

27. It was incumbent on the States parties to the Treaty to take advantage of the current favourable international climate in order to build a more stable and secure international order. The danger of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction threatened the whole of mankind. Therefore, all members of the international community must participate on an equal footing in the establishment of mechanisms and frameworks to eliminate that danger.

28. *Mr. Balboni Acqua (Italy), Vice President, took the Chair.*

29. **Mr. Reyes** (Colombia) said that Colombia had been a party to the Treaty from the outset and, along

with most of the Latin American countries, had agreed, through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. Colombia was convinced of the need to strengthen the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to achieve universality. His Government also attached great importance to the package of decisions adopted in 1995, including the "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", some of which remained unfulfilled, and the decision on "Strengthening the Review Process for the Treaty", which was essential to the continued validity of the Treaty.

30. The non-proliferation regime must be strengthened and made more efficient. There should be no fear of new constructive proposals to that end, and no efforts should be spared in considering possible actions which could dissipate a dangerous feeling of frustration among some States parties. There was a need to take up substantive issues from a broad viewpoint, as well as the procedural reforms that were necessary to avoid the failures of the past. Since the 1995 Conference, various States had acceded to the Treaty, including Brazil and Chile; elsewhere, the results had been less encouraging; the nuclear explosions carried out in South East Asia posed a major challenge. Although the States parties to the Treaty could not accept the existence of new self-declared nuclear Powers, they could not ignore that situation, and the Conference should consider ways of dealing with it.

31. With regard to the situation in the Middle East, the international community should maintain pressure on the only State in the region which was not a party to the Treaty to agree to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards as a contribution to confidence-building and the non-proliferation regime, and to regional and world peace. His Government welcomed the recent ratification of the START II Treaty by the Russian Federation. Much remained to be done in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, however, and the danger of nuclear war still existed, as well as the possibility of total destruction.

32. Although a reduction in the number of nuclear weapons was a step in the right direction, more decisive action was needed on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to establish a programme that would lead to their total elimination. In that respect, his delegation fully supported the proposals made on the previous day by Mexico. It also urged the States with the greatest nuclear capacity to begin negotiations straightaway on START III, a process in which the other nuclear-weapon States should be involved at some stage.

33. Colombia commended the States which had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, particularly the three nuclear-weapon States. It had signed that Treaty and was completing the ratification process. His country believed that it was urgent for negotiations to begin on the principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, on a non-discriminatory and universally applicable convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, and on a legally binding international agreement on security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States.

34. Colombia, which had never had aspirations in the sphere of nuclear weapons, attached great importance to cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The cooperation promised in that sphere had been very deficient, and concrete measures must be taken to correct that situation. Consideration should be given to the possibility of holding a special conference of the parties devoted exclusively to the promotion of cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

35. The debate on the Treaty and the nuclear disarmament process had underscored the gap between the rhetoric on international security and the rest of the multilateral agenda. Just as in other areas of that agenda, the promotion of human rights, respect for international humanitarian law and also the new concept of human security must be incorporated into international security. In 1995, the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT had accepted the indefinite extension of the Treaty, but not the indefinite continuation of a situation in which some States could have nuclear weapons and others could not. It was a matter of priority for the Conference to produce a plan of action with specific measures for nuclear disarmament, which should be implemented over the next five years.

36. **Mr. Shobokshi** (Saudi Arabia) said that the maintenance of international peace and security was one of the foremost objectives of the United Nations. In accordance with the Charter, Member States undertook to settle their international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in international relations

from the threat or use of force. The conclusion of the Treaty had been an international effort to reduce that threat by limiting nuclear proliferation and, ultimately, eliminating nuclear weapons. The 2000 Review Conference was an opportunity to conduct an objective evaluation of the progress made towards those goals and to identify the areas in which, and the means through which, further progress should be sought in the future.

37. Despite some positive developments, particularly the indefinite extension of the Treaty, the world was further than ever from achieving its principles and objectives. The States parties to the Treaty had been unable to halt the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons or to establish a fair balance of commitments and responsibilities between the nuclear-weapon States on the one hand and the non-nuclear-weapon States on the other. The retention by the nuclear Powers of large arsenals had served as a pretext for other States to conduct their own nuclear tests. The nuclear-weapon States must be reminded of their responsibility to avoid actions that encouraged non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire, manufacture or stockpile nuclear weapons.

38. The Security Council Summit Meeting on 31 January 1992 had declared that the proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction constituted a threat to international peace and security. While Council resolution 984 (1995) and the statements made at that time by each of the nuclear-weapon States could be considered as initial steps in that direction, an internationally negotiated, unconditional and legally binding document was needed to guarantee that non-nuclear States would not be subjected to nuclear attacks.

39. The international community must summon the political will to strengthen the non-proliferation regime, reduce the political and strategic importance of nuclear weapons in international relations and implement existing treaties that provided for disarmament and the reduction of nuclear stockpiles. The agreement to extend the Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely would not have been possible without the adoption by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of a number of Resolutions, including the "Resolution on the Middle East". Since then, however, serious efforts had been made to weaken and prevent the implementation of the Resolution. In order to be successful therefore, the 2000 Conference should review all of the issues that had been agreed upon in 1995.

40. Saudi Arabia supported all efforts being made to eliminate weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons in the Middle East. The Arab League's efforts to prepare a draft treaty aimed at establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East were evidence of the serious commitment of the Arab States, all of which had ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Those actions, however, did not guarantee the safety of the Arab States, given the continuing Israeli nuclear threat and that State's defiance of international law, including resolutions adopted by the General Assembly and IAEA. In order to achieve stable and balanced peace in the Middle East, Israel must eliminate its arsenal of nuclear weapons, accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subject its nuclear facilities to international safeguards.

41. Israel continued to disregard the appeals of the United Nations, IAEA, the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to desist from producing, experimenting with or stockpiling nuclear weapons. It was the only State in the Middle East which refused to subject its nuclear and chemical weapons to IAEA inspections safeguards. Israel's position and all its justifications for that position clearly contradicted its calls for peace; which must be based on trust and good will. Double standards towards Israel would not persuade it to do what was necessary in order to advance the Middle East peace process.

42. Saudi Arabia's commitment to nuclear disarmament was reflected in its refusal to produce, deploy or stockpile such weapons; its active involvement in the 1995 Conference; its participation in the Executive Council of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons; and its accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. He commended the constructive and crucial role of IAEA and its safety system in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; his delegation would support all efforts to enhance their effectiveness.

43. The current Conference must take an integral approach to international security. The final document should put forward a vision of the future based on lessons learned from the past, stress the need to achieve

international consensus, urge all States to become parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and call for the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. The final document should also include a reaffirmation of the Treaty obligation to avoid nuclear war and of the nuclear-weapon States' commitment to make every effort to stop the nuclear arms race and reduce their arsenals as a first step towards complete and total nuclear disarmament. Such action required transparency on the part of the nuclear-weapon States.

44. **Mr. Bellina** (Peru), speaking on behalf of the States members of the Andean Community, said that the problem of nuclear proliferation could either be viewed as the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons or defined in terms of both vertical and horizontal proliferation. The former was seen mainly in the developing world and its solution lay in the adoption of technical measures, such as restrictions on the transfer of equipment and technology. The latter involved not only a larger number of nuclear-weapon States but also an increase in their arsenals. The solution to that problem was essentially political.

45. The 2000 Review Conference must clearly establish that there was no reason to believe that the indefinite maintenance of nuclear weapons could be justified. What had been extended indefinitely in 1995 had been the Treaty and not the right to keep nuclear arsenals forever. It should not be forgotten that the Treaty itself imposed a contractual obligation on all its parties to progress towards general and complete disarmament. For the non-proliferation regime to be truly effective, those States that had not yet signed it, in particular, those with some nuclear capacity, should do so as speedily as possible. In that connection, the Andean Community welcomed the accession of Brazil and Chile to the Treaty.

46. The non-proliferation regime also provided for the right of States to receive the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Innovative approaches must therefore be adopted to permit both those groups that opposed the transfer of nuclear technologies to developing countries and those that rejected the arguments put forward by the technologically advanced countries to participate in decision-making. IAEA had an important role to play in that area and the 2000 Conference must take steps to reinforce the Agency's capacity to do so.

47. The region of Latin America and the Caribbean, which was the first populated region of the globe to have been declared a nuclear-weapon-free zone, firmly believed in the importance of such zones as a means of strengthening international peace and security. The entire southern hemisphere should be made into a nuclear-weapon-free zone by linking the existing zones that had been created by the Antarctic, Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok Treaties. Protecting non-nuclear-weapon States from the threat or use of nuclear weapons against them was another of the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Reaffirmation of that commitment by the nuclear-weapon States in the form of both positive and negative security assurances would facilitate the acceptance of the Treaty by States that were not yet parties. The early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was also important in that regard.

48. The Non-Proliferation Treaty could not be seen as the establishment of an international order based on the entitlement of a small group of States to possess nuclear weapons in perpetuity while the large majority of States lacked that right. In that connection, the member States of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL) had recently issued the Lima Appeal calling for the creation of greater international public awareness in order to advance in every field of action towards a complete prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The members of the Andean Community hoped that the results of the 2000 Review Conference would include practical measures that must be taken by all parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty during the next five years, particularly with regard to article VI.

49. *Mr. Minty (South Africa), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

50. **Mr. Hasmy** (Malaysia) recalled that when the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had agreed at the 1995 Conference to extend the Treaty indefinitely, the nuclear-weapon States parties had reaffirmed their commitment to pursue in good faith negotiations aimed at reducing and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons under strict and effective international control. A number of delegations, however, had had reservations about the wisdom of extending the Treaty indefinitely. Given the dismal record of nuclear disarmament during the period under

review, Malaysia continued to believe that by indefinitely extending the Treaty the international community had lost the only leverage that it had had with the nuclear-weapon States parties, which had no further incentive to make serious efforts towards the goal of reducing and eliminating their nuclear arsenals. The self-serving national interests of the nuclear-weapon States parties had taken control of the process at the expense of the larger interests of the international community.

51. Pursuant to the decision of the 1995 Conference to strengthen the review process for the Treaty, the 2000 Conference should undertake an objective and candid analysis of the achievements and failures of the previous five years and prepare a road map for the following five years. An analysis of the performance of States parties would reveal more negative than positive developments. On the positive side, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty represented a major achievement, even though a number of ratifications were still required for its entry into force. The recent decision by the Russian Federation to ratify the Treaty had made a positive contribution towards that goal. The earlier decision by the United States Senate not to ratify the Treaty, however, had been a disappointment, especially since the international community had looked to the United States for leadership on that important matter.

52. His delegation also welcomed the progress made in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) process and, in particular, the ratification of START II by the Russian Federation. However, the linkage that was being established between the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the beginning of the START III process gave cause for concern, in view of the destabilizing effect which the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defence system would have. Malaysia therefore urged the United States of America to reconsider its intention to develop and deploy such a system. The other nuclear-weapon States should also join in that process.

53. His delegation also welcomed the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and South-East Asia, which, together with similar zones in the South Pacific and South America, would form contiguous nuclear-weapon-free zones spanning the southern hemisphere. There had also been encouraging progress towards the creation of a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and acceptance of the innovative concept of a single-State nuclear-weapon-free zone, which had been advanced by Mongolia. The equally innovative proposal by Belarus for a nuclear-weapon-free corridor also merited serious consideration as part of a concerted global effort towards nuclear disarmament. Malaysia looked forward to the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions, including the Middle East and South Asia.

54. The period under review, however, had also witnessed a number of negative and disturbing developments. The nuclear-weapon States had failed to fulfil with determination the undertakings in the field of nuclear disarmament set out in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, no serious efforts had been made on the multilateral disarmament track and only half-hearted efforts had been made on the bilateral track. No serious effort had been made either to secure at the earliest possible date the accession of non-States parties to the Treaty. Instead, the period had seen the emergence of two more or less declared nuclear-weapon Powers in South Asia. While nine new States had acceded to the Treaty, four others, three of which had nuclear-weapon options and operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, remained outside of the Treaty regime. Malaysia reiterated its call for the establishment of a high-level consultation mechanism to promote the universality of the Treaty.

55. Far from preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, the period under review had witnessed the explosion of nuclear devices by the above-mentioned non-States parties, which had conducted a series of tests in order to attain the status of nuclear Powers, with serious implications for regional and international security. Also, contrary to the stated objective of decision 2 of the 1995 Conference, there had been no immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The current Review Conference should therefore make an unambiguous pronouncement on the matter.

56. The agreements entered into at the 1995 Conference had not been fully honoured. While some small progress had been achieved during the previous decade towards reducing the total number of nuclear weapons deployed by the nuclear-weapon States, the latter had reasserted their full commitment to the dangerous and outmoded doctrine of nuclear deterrence

as a cornerstone of their defence and security policies. In the mistaken belief that the possession of nuclear weapons increased their security, they continued to ignore the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice to pursue in good faith and conclude negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament under strict and effective international control. The Conference on Disarmament continued to be in a state of limbo as demonstrated by its inability to constitute a working group on nuclear disarmament and commence negotiations on a fissile material cut-off convention. In addition, new players had emerged in the deadly game of nuclear armaments, with all its ramifications for regional and global security.

57. It was worthwhile recalling the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice that the use of nuclear weapons seemed scarcely reconcilable with the provisions of humanitarian law protecting civilians and combatants from unnecessary and indiscriminate effects of warfare. Indeed, the President of the Court had stated that with nuclear weapons humanity was living on a kind of suspended sentence, subjecting itself to a perverse and unremitting nuclear blackmail. Each year since 1996, Malaysia had sponsored a resolution in the First Committee and the General Assembly that drew attention to the unanimous opinion of the Court.

58. The Non-Proliferation Treaty was at a crossroads and the goodwill and patience of the non-nuclear-weapon States were being put under severe strain by the lack of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their part of the bargain. Without a serious change of attitude on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation and the Treaty itself risked serious erosion. Many of the ideas on how to propel the disarmament process forward deserved serious consideration.

59. What was really required, however, was for the international community to work towards a comprehensive and legally binding international instrument that would prohibit the development, testing, deployment, stockpiling, threat or use of nuclear weapons and ensure their destruction under effective international control. In that connection, the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, which had been in circulation since 1997, deserved serious consideration. Notwithstanding its disappointment at the lack of tangible progress in the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty following its indefinite extension, in concert with other States parties, Malaysia would continue to work towards the full realization of its provisions.

60. **Mr. Dorda** (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) supported the Secretary-General's appeal in his millennium report (A/54/2000, para. 252) for a reaffirmation of political commitment to reducing the dangers from existing nuclear weapons and from further proliferation, and noted from the report (ibid., para. 248) that, despite the passing of the balance of nuclear terror into history, some 35,000 nuclear weapons remained in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers, with thousands still deployed on hair-trigger alert. Clearly, no tangible progress towards nuclear disarmament had been achieved. The non-proliferation regime could not continue unless the nuclear-weapon States gave evidence that they were fully committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the gradual elimination of nuclear weapons.

61. He welcomed some positive developments since the holding of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. They included the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of July 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (see General Assembly resolution 54/54 Q); the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) by General Assembly resolution 50/245; and the recent ratification by the Russian Federation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of 1991 (START II) and the CTBT.

62. There had been some negative developments, however. They included the United States Senate's rejection of ratification of the CTBT; that country's consideration of the feasibility of developing a nuclear-missile-defence system ("Star Wars"); and the adoption by NATO of the strategic concept that nuclear weapons were the only means of keeping the peace, which had been countered by the Russian Federation's declaration that nuclear weapons were an important element of national security.

63. By assisting Israel in developing weapons of mass destruction, Washington employed double standards, since it imposed punitive sanctions on some States even though they had opened their nuclear facilities to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and blackmailed another State, trying to prevent its acquisition of nuclear technology

for peaceful purposes even though that State was a party to the NPT.

64. Israel's development of nuclear weapons threatened an entire region, ranging from the Western Mediterranean to India. While all the Arab States were parties to the Treaty, Tel Aviv refused to accede to it and ignored the international community's call to transform the Middle East into a nuclear-free zone. Encouraged by a super-Power, Israel, by pursuing its nuclear programme and rejecting the NPT, constituted a serious threat to international peace and security and undermined the credibility of the Treaty regime.

65. Some other recent developments were a further cause for concern. One European State had provided Israel with three submarines capable of deploying nuclear weapons, while another had negotiated with Israel secretly to sell it nuclear reactors despite Israel's refusal to put its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision. Furthermore, the United States had lifted its restriction on Israeli scientists conducting nuclear research in its laboratories. Such developments cast doubt on the seriousness of some States parties to the Treaty in their call for universal accession. Furthermore, one super-Power resisted all efforts to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty, while Israel opposed all United Nations resolutions calling for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

66. With the exception of Israel, all States in the Middle East were parties to the Treaty. The Libyan Arab Jamahiriya therefore called upon the Conference to stress that Israel must accede to the Treaty, without conditions or delay, and must place all its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision; to ensure that the nuclear-weapon States undertook, under article I of the Treaty, not to transfer nuclear weapons or devices or means of control, directly or indirectly, to Israel, and not to encourage it to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; to stress the commitment to prohibit the transfer of all nuclear equipment and expertise to Israel until it placed its nuclear facilities under IAEA supervision; to call for the speedy transformation of the Middle East into a nuclear-weapons-free zone; and to establish a subsidiary body of the Second Committee of the Conference to review the "Resolution on the Middle East" adopted by the 1995 Conference and to put forward recommendations for its implementation.

67. Since the universality of the Treaty was vital to its continued viability, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya welcomed the recent accessions to the Treaty and called upon all States which had not yet acceded to it to do so without delay. The Conference should adopt a number of measures for the non-proliferation and reduction of nuclear weapons. It should stress the importance of the undertakings laid down in the ninth to the twelfth preambular paragraphs and in articles I and VI of the Treaty; draw the attention of the nuclear-weapon States parties to their obligation to implement the Treaty fully, and to refrain from any form of nuclear partnership among themselves or with non-nuclear-weapon States in the framework of any regional security arrangements; institute a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons, equipment and know-how and stress the need for the provision of assistance in the peaceful use of nuclear energy to all parties to the Treaty; reaffirm the importance of reversing the nuclear-arms race and eliminating all nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame; and reaffirm that priority in disarmament negotiations should be given to nuclear disarmament.

68. In addition, the Conference should invite the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate on urgent measures to halt the nuclear-arms race; implement the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the obligation to pursue negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict international control; call upon the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee for nuclear disarmament, taking into account all proposals of the Group of 21 submitted to that Conference; and to start negotiations on a programme of nuclear disarmament with a view to their elimination within a specified time, including an agreement on prohibition of the development, acquisition, storage and use of or threat to use such weapons.

69. The Review Conference should also call upon the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate, within the ad hoc committee, the early adoption of a treaty prohibiting the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons; and stress the importance of setting up a body subsidiary to the First Committee of the 2000 Conference to review practical steps to eliminate nuclear weapons. On the question of security safeguards, he called on the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish the body on negative security safeguards, and stressed the need for a treaty

among nuclear-weapon States to guarantee that they would not resort to the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. All States, including States not party to the Treaty, should subject all their nuclear facilities to IAEA supervision.

70. There was a need to emphasize the commitment to the full implementation of article IV of the Treaty, concerning cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy as an important contribution to development. To that end, the Review Conference should emphasize the right of States to continue the application of nuclear technology, with a guarantee of its transfer without discrimination; eliminate the prohibition imposed by certain countries on the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes on the pretext that it could be used for chemical weapons; and reaffirm the responsibility of the nuclear States parties to support the legitimate need of other States parties for nuclear energy, especially developing countries, and also reaffirm that any threat against peaceful nuclear facilities posed a serious danger and must be prohibited.

71. In conclusion, he called upon the Conference to adopt recommendations for an end to the nuclear-missile state of alert, the withdrawal of nuclear missiles deployed in foreign countries, the commencement of negotiations on a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons and an end to double standards with regard to nuclear weapons, and the allocation of funds resulting from nuclear disarmament for improving the living standards of the poorer countries.

72. **Mr. Staehelin** (Switzerland) noted an imbalance between the active implementation of articles II and III of the Treaty and the relative lack of progress under article VI. The 1995 extension must not be construed as an indefinite extension of the status quo, particularly with regard to the prerogatives of the nuclear-weapon States and their obligations under article VI. The imbalance jeopardized the very bases for concluding, and later extending, the Non-Proliferation Treaty: the reciprocal commitment to non-proliferation by the vast majority of States parties and to disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States, the adoption of the Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament and the resolution on the Middle East and the establishment of a strengthened review process.

73. The lack of progress indicated that the strengthened review process had not been fully effective and that the Preparatory Committee had been unable to achieve its main objective of formulating recommendations on the application and universality of the Treaties. Perhaps the functioning of the strengthened review process and the role of the Preparatory Committee should be reconsidered in order to bring about effective implementation of the Treaty. Conference documents should include a review of the application of the Treaty and the Principles and Objectives since the 1995 Conference and a new package of reaffirmed principles and updated objectives to supplement the 1995 documents, which should be adopted by consensus.

74. Reaffirmation of the fundamental compromise — the link between disarmament and non-proliferation and the link between the Treaty's extension and the adoption of the Principles and Objectives in 1995 — should be the starting point for revitalizing the review process. The new objectives should include measures to redress the negative developments of recent years, possibly in the form of a new plan of action with a view to measuring the progress achieved at the sessions of the Preparatory Committee and at review conferences. His delegation would be submitting a working paper on such a plan, which should include confidence-building measures and information that would increase the transparency of efforts undertaken to implement the Principles and Objectives, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States.

75. The plan of action should provide for further systematic reductions in nuclear weapons, including unilateral reductions, on the basis of article VI. In that regard, the United States and the Russian Federation had a special responsibility; and reductions by those States would set an example for nuclear-weapon States which were not parties to the Treaty. The plan should also provide for the elimination of warheads and the application of IAEA safeguards to fissile materials; the inclusion of tactical nuclear weapons in formal disarmament processes; and a moratorium on nuclear testing pending the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

76. Laboratory tests conducted for the purpose of developing new weapons should be considered incompatible with the preamble of the Test-Ban Treaty. In addition, pending the start of negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes, all States should adopt transparency

measures and declare a moratorium in that field. The Conference on Disarmament must intensify its efforts in the area of security assurances. Lastly, referring to the tests conducted by India and Pakistan and the situation in the Middle East and other regions, he urged parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be more aware of the regional aspects of non-proliferation.

77. **Mr. Hoffmann** (Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization) said that only the signature and ratification of the Treaty by as many countries as possible and a worldwide verification system would guarantee the successful implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Thus far, 28 of the 44 States listed in Annex 2 to the Treaty had ratified it, including two nuclear-weapon States — France and the United Kingdom. Two other States Signatories, Chile and the Russian Federation, were completing parliamentary procedures for ratification.

78. Membership and ratification had been the focus of the first Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, held in Vienna in October 1999. The Conference had reaffirmed the importance of the Treaty and had stressed that unilateral moratoriums on testing were no substitute for a binding international legal instrument such as the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty. It had also considered measures to accelerate the ratification process in order to facilitate the Treaty's early entry into force.

79. The Treaty's global verification regime included an International Monitoring System; consultation and clarification; on-site inspections; and confidence-building measures. Since the global verification regime was to be capable of functioning upon the Treaty's entry into force, one of the Preparatory Commission's main tasks was to enhance the International Monitoring System's worldwide network of seismological, infrasound, hydroacoustic and radionuclide stations. The System would be capable of registering vibrations under ground, in the sea and in the air, and of detecting traces of radionuclides released into the atmosphere by nuclear explosions.

80. The data gathered by the stations would be relayed via satellite to the International Data Centre in Vienna and would then be available to States signatories. The budgetary appropriation of US$ 92.1 million for capital investment from 1997 to 2000 represented approximately 43 per cent of the total amount required to complete the network. The International Data Centre, the nerve centre of the verification system, was capable of transmitting bulletins, data from the International Monitoring System and additional information to States signatories seven days a week.

81. The Preparatory Commission was also laying the groundwork for on-site inspections by developing an operational manual and specifications for equipment to be used at the International Monitoring System stations; a passive seismic system for aftershock detection would be received shortly for testing and training. At the invitation of the Government of Kazakhstan, a field experiment simulating aspects of an on-site inspection following a chemical explosion had been conducted in that country in October 1999.

82. The Preparatory Commission had already organized two international cooperation workshops in Vienna and Cairo; and two more were scheduled to be held in Beijing and Lima. The Commission enjoyed the active support and participation of the Treaty's States signatories. In conclusion, he called on all States participating in the current Review Conference to support and contribute to the preparations for the Test-Ban Treaty's entry into force.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.

NPT/CONF.2000/SR.5

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

19 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 5th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 2000, at 10 a.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later:	Mr. Gorita (Vice-President)	(Romania)
later:	Mr. Baali (President)	(Algeria)

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00-40487 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Goerens** (Luxembourg) said the fact that 187 States, including the five nuclear Powers, had become parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) demonstrated the vital importance of that instrument and its impact on the maintenance of world peace and security. Unfortunately, however, four countries, including India and Pakistan, which had recently conducted nuclear tests, thus endangering security in their region, remained outside the Treaty. He urged those countries to renounce nuclear weapons and accede to the Treaty as soon as possible. He was also alarmed at efforts by some States parties to the Treaty to develop nuclear weapons, in clear violation of their Treaty obligations.

2. Although Luxembourg had decided not to have nuclear power plants on its territory, it benefited from a number of peaceful applications of nuclear energy, particularly for medical and research purposes. His country had always pursued a strict nuclear non-proliferation policy and had established machinery to combat trafficking in sensitive nuclear material and equipment.

3. The nuclear Powers had not made as much progress towards nuclear disarmament as had been hoped. Nevertheless, the Russian Federation's ratification of the second of the strategic arms reduction treaties, START II, was an encouraging development. However, that historic breakthrough had to be consolidated through the ratification of the related protocol and the implementation of the Treaty on schedule. It was equally encouraging that the Russian Federation and the United States of America had stated their willingness to begin negotiations on START III. A substantial reduction in non-strategic nuclear weapons was also necessary in the near future.

4. In the area of non-proliferation, the 13 non-nuclear-weapon States members of the European Union together with France and the United Kingdom had concluded three additional protocols with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Some of the States members of the Union had already ratified their additional protocol, while others, including Luxembourg, would do so in the near future. All those States that had not yet concluded additional protocols with the Agency, should do so without delay.

5. His delegation welcomed the improvement in the political situation in the Middle East and the efforts being undertaken by all the parties concerned to work to bring lasting peace to that region. He hoped that such efforts would have a positive impact on the universal implementation of the Treaty as well as on efforts to establish a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the region.

6. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was of utmost importance to nuclear disarmament. He therefore urged those States among the 44 whose accession was required for its entry into force, to assume their responsibilities without further delay. In that regard, the decision by the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT was a significant breakthrough. He trusted that that bold step would encourage the two other nuclear-weapon States that had still not acceded to the Treaty, as well as India and Pakistan, to ratify it in the near future.

7. It was regrettable that negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty had not yet started within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. He hoped that one of the positive outcomes of the current work of the Conference would be the start of those negotiations.

8. **Mr. Sun Joun-yung** (Republic of Korea) said that, in order to make the NPT a strong and effective regime, the Review Conference must address the major issues of nuclear disarmament and the immediate programme of action, universality, non-compliance, safeguards and negative security assurances. The main responsibility for nuclear disarmament rested with the nuclear-weapon States. In that regard, he welcomed the Russian Federation's ratification of START II and looked forward to the commencement of the START III negotiations. He hoped that nuclear-weapon States would reduce their nuclear arsenals and enhance the transparency of the process by submitting the relevant documents as well as their future plans in that regard during periodic NPT review conferences. Moreover, nuclear-weapon States should try to lessen their dependence on nuclear weapons in their military strategies. It was time to enhance a multilateral exchange of information and views on nuclear disarmament. His delegation would support the establishment of an ad hoc working group in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament for that purpose.

9. He called upon all States that had not yet signed or and ratified the CTBT, especially those States among the 44 whose accession was required for its entry into force, to do so without further delay. The nuclear-weapon States must provide leadership in that regard. His delegation therefore welcomed the recent decision of the Russian Federation to ratify the CTBT and urged China and the United States of America to expedite their ratification processes. Moreover, negotiations on the fissile material cut-off treaty should begin immediately and, pending the conclusion of an agreement, a moratorium should be placed on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

10. Universality and strict observance of the NPT were central to preserving its role in the maintenance of international peace and security. He therefore urged the international community to redouble its efforts to reverse the nuclear arms race in South Asia, in the wake of the nuclear tests conducted there, and to call upon the States concerned to implement Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) as soon as possible. Moreover, Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan should accede to the Treaty. No States other than the current five nuclear-weapon States should be recognized as such, nor should any new category of States be created under the NPT.

11. He expressed concern over the non-compliance by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea with the IAEA safeguards agreement and called upon that country to implement that agreement fully and faithfully. In that regard, his delegation welcomed the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol to the IAEA safeguards agreement and hoped that the Agency would establish an integrated safeguards system as soon as practical. His delegation upheld the principle that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT that fully complied with their obligations had a legitimate right to receive assurances from nuclear-weapon States that the latter would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.

12. *Mr. Gorita (Romania), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

13. **Mr. Mra** (Myanmar) said that Myanmar was strongly in favour of nuclear disarmament and was fully committed to its realization. Apart from the conclusion of the CTBT, there had been no tangible achievement in the implementation of the NPT since its indefinite extension in 1995. Two of the threshold States had established their de facto nuclear-weapon status by conducting nuclear tests, which had seriously set back the non-proliferation regime. Moreover, two nuclear-weapon States had yet to ratify the CTBT. It was necessary to build a stronger international consensus to discourage any new development of nuclear weapons and to dismantle the existing weapons. The nuclear Powers should set an example in that area. His delegation welcomed the decision by the Russian Federation to ratify START II and the CTBT. The ratification of START II paved the way for the commencement of negotiations on START III.

14. At the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties, his delegation had submitted some proposals for incorporation into the document on Principles and Objectives, and a programme of action on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament. His delegation believed that universal adherence to the NPT remained an urgent priority. The best defence against a nuclear catastrophe remained the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such weapons. The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones through the adoption of the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba had gone a long way in limiting the geographical proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhancing global and regional peace and security. He urged all States parties to call for an early entry into force of the protocols, which had still to be ratified by the nuclear-weapon States, through the swift resolution of the remaining issues in a spirit of amity and cooperation.

15. **Mr. Wehbe** (Syrian Arab Republic) said that his country had been one of the first in the Middle East to sign the NPT and noted that all Arab States of the Middle East had since then become parties to the Treaty. Israel, however, had so far shown no intention of doing so or of placing its nuclear installations under the comprehensive safeguards regime of the IAEA. The Syrian Arab Republic had been the first to call for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Yet Israel had failed to respond to any call from the United Nations or the international community as a whole to achieve that goal.

16. The Treaty had been in force for some 30 years, but universality of adherence to it had not been achieved, the world was not a more secure place after the end of the cold war, and nuclear weapons continued

to proliferate. The non-nuclear-weapon States might well wonder to what extent the nuclear-weapon States parties had fulfilled their commitments to work for the elimination of nuclear weapons, prevent proliferation and help non-nuclear-weapon States parties in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology.

17. Although the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes was a legitimate right of all parties to the Treaty, double standards prevailed: the nuclear-weapon States which exported nuclear material hindered the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties, even though the latter were committed to subjecting their nuclear installations to international inspection. Yet at the same time those exporting States covertly and overtly transferred advanced nuclear technology to Israel. Indeed, one nuclear-weapon State had agreed to give Israeli scientists access to its nuclear establishments, enabling Israel to improve its nuclear technology and develop nuclear weapons. Such actions violated the Treaty in letter and spirit. The security guarantees which the nuclear-weapon States had given to the non-nuclear-weapon States did not satisfy the requirements of the latter and did nothing to dispel their fears, since those guarantees were non-binding and had not been negotiated in an international forum.

18. It was therefore important to begin negotiations on the drafting of a binding document providing comprehensive security guarantees to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. The IAEA comprehensive safeguards system was a major factor in preserving nuclear peace in the world, and it was incumbent on all States parties under article III to conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency.

19. His delegation wondered how long the nuclear-weapon States would continue to defend Israel, which used its nuclear power for aggression and expansion, pursued an ambiguous policy in respect of its nuclear facilities and ignored all appeals of the international community. Pressure must be brought to bear on Israel to induce it to accede to the Treaty and subject its nuclear facilities to Agency supervision. Its continued military occupation of Arab territories and its continued defiance of international commitments and agreements threatened to destabilize peace and security in the region.

20. At the 1995 Conference, the nuclear-weapon States had achieved their goal — the indefinite extension of the Treaty — but had not yet fulfilled their part of the compact, which was to address the grievances of the non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the deficiencies of the Treaty. His delegation appealed to States to make the Treaty universal and called upon the nuclear-weapon States to abide by article VI. Furthermore, profoundly concerned over Israel's behaviour and its rejection of the Treaty, it urgently advocated a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. That could be achieved only if Israel acceded to the Treaty and placed its nuclear facilities under international control.

21. His Government endorsed the resolution recently adopted by the League of Arab States, which had called for: a comprehensive review of compliance by States parties with the commitments undertaken at the 1995 Conference; renewed emphasis on the fact that Israel's continuation of its nuclear programme outside the purview of the Treaty and its refusal to accede to the Treaty and to subject its nuclear facilities to IAEA supervision constituted a direct threat to international peace and security and undermined the credibility of the non-proliferation regime; renewed efforts by all States parties, and particularly the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States, as sponsors of the resolution on the Middle East adopted at the 1995 Conference, to induce Israel to accede to the Treaty and to subject its nuclear installations to the safeguards regime; reaffirmation by the nuclear-weapon States of their commitment under article I of the Treaty not to assist Israel in the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; the creation of a subsidiary body of Main Committee II to review the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East; and renewed efforts to transform the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

22. In conclusion, his delegation called on the States parties, and particularly the Depositary Governments, to put pressure on Israel to heed the appeals of the international community so as to banish the nuclear nightmare and bring about stability and peace in the Middle East.

23. **Mr. Shihab** (Maldives) said that, although the optimism generated by the end of the cold war had not produced the hoped-for results, the past 50 years had seen major progress towards nuclear disarmament and arms control at the bilateral and multilateral levels. The CTBT had become a reality, several nuclear-weapon-

free zones had been declared, the number of nuclear weapons had been almost halved, the world's military expenditure had declined by about 30 per cent during the past two decades alone, and START II had finally been ratified, paving the way for negotiations on START III. Nevertheless, hundreds of nuclear warheads remained; weapons research, production and testing continued unabated; there had been no progress towards the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty and the threat of nuclear terrorism loomed.

24. No State party to the Treaty should ignore its obligations under that instrument or interpret the Treaty in any way contrary to the intended objectives. The indefinite extension and near-universality of the Treaty had reaffirmed its validity as the basis for the non-proliferation regime. However, developments since the 1995 Conference had shown the importance of achieving universal ratification of the Treaty and improving implementation of its provisions.

25. The nuclear-weapon States had an obligation to provide unconditional, legally binding security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States and to refrain from sharing nuclear material, equipment or technology with non-nuclear-weapon States or States not parties to the Treaty. Moreover, all States parties should have an equal right, without discrimination, to the use of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

26. His Government supported all efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones and called for urgent measures that would make it possible to establish such a zone in the Middle East. It was firmly opposed to nuclear testing and called on those who had not yet become parties to the CTBT to do so as soon as possible and without conditions.

27. The relationship between disarmament and development could not be overemphasized; there could be no rationale for spending billions of dollars on weapons of mass destruction when millions of people were plagued by poverty, hunger, malnutrition and disease. Funds spent on military build-up should be diverted to the eradication of poverty and disease throughout the world, and an increased portion of the resources made available through the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation agreements should be made available for economic and social development with a view to reducing the ever-widening gap between the developed and developing countries.

28. **Mr. Grudziński** (Poland) said that his Government was convinced that the Treaty remained the mainstay of the global non-proliferation regime and a principal element of international peace and security. Since the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, Poland had ratified the CTBT and was actively involved in the proceedings of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization in Vienna. Its safeguards agreement with the IAEA had been in force since 1972; it had recently ratified the additional protocol to that agreement and urged other States parties to do the same; and its National Atomic Energy Agency was working to bring national legislation into line with the international instruments to which Poland was a party.

29. He was concerned at the fact that three of the four States not parties to the Treaty were believed to possess nuclear-weapon capability and that two of them, India and Pakistan, had carried out nuclear-weapon tests, thereby placing in jeopardy both the Treaty and international peace and security. It was also disturbing that some nuclear-weapon States had not yet ratified the CTBT. He therefore welcomed the Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify that instrument and was encouraged by the continued efforts of the Administration of the United States of America to induce Congress to follow suit. He hoped that China would also pursue ratification and that the United States of America and the Russian Federation would soon begin START III negotiations. He was pleased that two nuclear-weapon States, France and the United Kingdom, had unilaterally reduced their nuclear arsenals and made them more transparent, thereby contributing to the development of a climate of confidence among countries, but it was disappointing that the Conference on Disarmament had been unable to undertake productive negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty.

30. A new nuclear arms race would threaten the existing international security balance. He therefore urged the Governments of certain Asian and Middle Eastern States to comply fully with their safeguards obligations. He also welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), which had established a new United Nations monitoring, verification and inspection commission for Iraq, and called for its full and early implementation.

31. The past five years had shown that, while the strengthened review process developed in 1995 did not require any major change, it needed a more effective implementation mechanism. Substantial progress having been made during the past five years, the 2000 Review Conference should focus on a positive, realistic programme of action that would reinforce the Treaty and thereby consolidate international peace and security.

32. **Mr. Arcaya** (Venezuela) said that while he was encouraged by the fact that various States had become parties to the Treaty since 1995 and by the entry into force of the CTBT, a number of negative developments had cast doubt on the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and created a climate of uncertainty and confusion in the area of disarmament. The lack of progress in the Conference on Disarmament, the nuclear tests carried out in South Asia, the increased emphasis on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence by nuclear-weapon States and the possible deployment of a national anti-missile defence system had hindered the development of genuine cooperation for arms control. He hoped that the 2000 Review Conference would help to restore the confidence necessary to that process and called on States parties to display flexibility in order to overcome difficulties and ensure implementation of the decisions taken at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

33. Given its commitment to nuclear disarmament, as reflected in its accession to the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, his Government was discouraged by the delays in implementation of START II and by the fact that START III negotiations had not yet begun. When the Treaty had been extended indefinitely in 1995, it had hoped that both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States would assume their obligations under that instrument in a balanced manner. However, to date, the nuclear-weapon States had failed to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament under article VI of the Treaty. While the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT was gratifying, it was more important than ever for all nuclear-weapon States to further decrease their nuclear arsenals.

34. He endorsed the proposals made by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement and by the representative of Mexico on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition. In particular, he supported those who had called for nuclear weapons to be progressively taken off alert status, for nuclear warheads to be separated from their systems of delivery and for the non-deployment of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons. His Government attached great importance to the development of a binding legal instrument establishing standards and principles to provide security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States.

35. Negotiations on a multilateral fissile material cut-off treaty should be initiated as quickly as possible; in the interim, nuclear-weapon States should agree to a moratorium on the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons. The decision recently taken by the Government of the United Kingdom was an encouraging step in that direction.

36. He hoped that the Russian Federation's recent decision to ratify the CTBT would lead other nuclear-weapon States not yet parties to that instrument to follow suit. It was also important to increase the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, including scientific research, electrical power, agriculture, medicine and industry, through international cooperation with developing countries.

37. He welcomed the nuclear-weapon-free zones established under the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba and Bangkok and supported the establishment of such zones in other regions such as the Middle East and Central Asia. In that regard, he welcomed the Mongolian Government's decision to declare its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

38. **Mr. Abulhasan** (Kuwait) noted that adequate progress had still not been made towards eliminating nuclear stockpiles and freeing the world of nuclear weapons. The spectre of a nuclear war was ever-present, and nuclear arsenals continued to proliferate outside the purview of IAEA. However, the opportunity remained for the nuclear-weapon States to show serious intentions of abandoning their nuclear weapons and stockpiles. In that regard, he welcomed the Russian Federation's decision to ratify START II and the CTBT.

39. As the Secretary-General had noted, there were in the world more than 35,000 nuclear missiles, a small fraction of which would be sufficient to reduce the world to ashes. His Government hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would heed the appeals of the peoples and Governments of the world to renounce

their nuclear weapons and stockpiles, for which no justification remained. It reminded the nuclear-weapon States of their obligation to refrain from encouraging or assisting other States in the manufacture or acquisition of such weapons, and drew attention to the unanimous advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 1996 on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. A spirit of pessimism and grave concern prevailed among the peoples of the world regarding the failure to realize nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, peace being sacrificed in favour of selfish national interests.

40. Iraq had still failed to comply with Security Council resolutions on renouncing weapons of mass destruction. That failure had been borne out by the Director General of IAEA, who had indicated earlier in the Conference that the Agency had not been in a position during the past two years to implement its mandate from the Security Council, namely, to guarantee that Iraq had complied with its commitments. Ever since Iraq had ceased its cooperation, the Security Council had spared no effort to induce it to resume cooperation but had been compelled to conclude that Iraq had not fully complied with its resolutions and had not cooperated with United Nations inspectors. There were many steps which Iraq must still take. His Government therefore renewed its appeal to Iraq to renounce its weapons of mass destruction. He welcomed the establishment in December 1999 by the Security Council of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and hoped that Iraq would be prompted to cooperate with it.

41. The fact that all the Arab States had become parties to the NPT had not provided the minimum security requirements to ward off the Israeli nuclear threat. Israel, the only State in the region not a party to the Treaty, continued to defy the appeals of the international community and refused to allow IAEA to inspect its nuclear facilities. Its actions destabilized the balance of power in the Middle East and threatened international peace and security. The international community should put pressure on Israel to eliminate its nuclear arsenal and to implement the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Conference and to place its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards regime. It should call on all States to cease providing any assistance that might contribute to Israel's nuclear programme. Israel's actions clearly contradicted its claim that it desired peace.

42. His delegation welcomed the accession by nine States, including three Arab States, to the Treaty. They were currently undertaking procedures to conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements with IAEA. The world looked forward to a twenty-first century of peace and stability, and a way must be found to eliminate nuclear weapons and to cease all nuclear tests. His delegation welcomed the expression of good intentions by the nuclear-weapon States in their statements at the Conference. It earnestly called on those nuclear-weapon States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so or suffer the censure of future generations.

43. *Mr. Baali resumed the Chair.*

Credentials of representatives to the Conference (*continued*)

(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee (*continued*)

44. **The President** said that rule 3 of the rules of procedure provided that, in addition to the election of the Chairman and the two Vice-Chairmen, the Conference should appoint six members of the Credentials Committee on the proposal of the President of the Conference. He therefore proposed the appointment of Austria, Chile, Morocco, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland. If there was no objection, he would take it that the Conference wished to adopt that proposal.

45. *It was so decided.*

46. *Austria, Chile, Morocco, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Switzerland were appointed members of the Credentials Committee.*

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

23 May 2000

Original: English

Summary record of the 6th meeting

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York, on Wednesday, 26 April 2000, at 3 p.m.

President:	Mr. Baali	(Algeria)
later	Mr. Niehaus (Vice-President)	(Costa Rica)
later	Mr. Baali (President)	(Algeria)

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Organization of work

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

The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

General debate (*continued*)

1. **Mr. Jagland** (Norway) stressed that disarmament by nuclear-weapon States was as important as nuclear non-proliferation and reiterated his Government's full support for the goals established at the 1995 Review Conference. The tests carried out by India and Pakistan; the delay in initiating the START II process; the impasse in the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty; and the delay in the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) called for fresh impetus and new and concrete non-proliferation and disarmament measures. The growing importance of nuclear weapons in international politics was a trend that must be reversed.

2. The general objectives of the current Conference should be to maintain and build on the results of the 1995 Conference, revitalize and improve working procedures with a view to strengthening the Non-Proliferation Treaty process, and improve the substantive work of the process through initiatives and measures acceptable to both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Of key importance were the development of a programme of action for the coming five-year period, an increased focus on regional issues, and the elaboration of a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material.

3. In view of the deficiencies in the strengthened review process and the fact that the Principles and Objectives adopted in 1995 remained largely unfulfilled, Norway would be submitting a proposal for a programme of action to the current Conference. The proposed programme of action would call on States parties to follow up the decisions taken by review conferences and, to that end, recommend an increase in the number of annual meetings in the review process from three to four, with a narrower focus on a few specific issues. The programme of action would also contain proposals on developing a comprehensive strategy for dealing with fissile material, including negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons purposes; promoting the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; reviewing information on strategic nuclear arms reductions, including the START process; promoting transparency with regard to tactical nuclear weapons and the destruction of such weapons; urging States to sign and ratify the International Atomic Energy Agency's new additional protocol on full-scope safeguards; and increasing transparency in nuclear-related export controls.

4. The nuclear tests carried out by India and Pakistan in 1998 had highlighted the importance of analysing the underlying causes of regional conflict and tension, and of taking into account arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation in addressing regional issues. Since the only regional issue before the Conference was the situation in the Middle East, a more ambitious and balanced package of regional issues, including the situation in South Asia, should be dealt with at the annual review meetings. It was also vital to address regional situations where parties to the Treaty failed to comply with their obligations.

5. His delegation would be submitting a proposal for an international framework to deal with fissile material that included a ban on the future production of fissile material for weapons, verification that surplus military stocks of fissile material would not be diverted to weapons programmes, measures for the safety and control of highly enriched uranium produced for non-explosive purposes, and voluntary transparency measures with respect to military inventories of fissile material. Those issues should be addressed either parallel to or independently of the negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on a fissile material cut-off treaty, which, regrettably, had not even begun.

6. The nuclear-weapon States had a special responsibility to reduce their arsenals and to increase transparency with regard to existing stocks of weapons, intended reductions and nuclear policies. His delegation welcomed the recent decisions of the Russian State Duma on START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and encouraged the Russian Federation and the United States of America to implement further measures for strategic arms control, in particular, by increasing the transparency of strategic nuclear warhead inventories as agreed by Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin at the 1997 Helsinki Summit. It would be regrettable if current doubts about the viability of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty were to aggravate an already difficult situation.

7. Greater attention should be focused on the risks of tactical nuclear weapons, which could be rapidly deployed and play a destabilizing role in conflict areas.

The situation called for increased transparency, a programme of warhead destruction and verification procedures. The 1999 unilateral decisions by the United States and the Russian Federation to eliminate tactical nuclear weapons should be reconfirmed and a time-frame should be established for their implementation. A large number of obsolete and decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines from the former Soviet Union had, over the years, produced huge quantities of radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel that were a threat to the environment. Norway had offered to cooperate with the Russian Federation in order to accelerate the construction of an infrastructure for removing and storing those materials. The task, however, was so complicated and costly that nothing short of a broad-based international effort would be required. To that end, Norway had initiated negotiations with the Russian Federation and a number of potential donor countries.

8. *Mr. Niehaus (Costa Rica), Vice-President, took the Chair.*

9. **Mr. Enkhsaikhan** (Mongolia) said that, despite the threat of horizontal proliferation and the emergence of new nuclear deterrence, doctrines and strategies that allowed for the use of nuclear weapons, his delegation fully agreed with the President that the international community should avoid yielding to pessimism. It welcomed other, more positive trends, including the reduction of non-strategic nuclear arsenals by the two major nuclear-weapon States, their conclusion of bilateral nuclear arms limitation and reduction agreements and their agreement in principle to further reductions; the 1996 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons; the adoption of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by an overwhelming majority and its ratification by 55 States, including Mongolia; and the outcome of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference.

10. Mongolia also welcomed the recent decision by the Russian State Duma to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and START II and the recent accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty by nine countries. His delegation attached great importance to the historic 1995 Conference and believed that its decisions should be further strengthened by the current Conference. Generally speaking, his delegation's position on the outcome of the 1995 Conference was reflected in the documents of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, including the Final Document of the recent Thirteenth Ministerial Meeting held in Cartagena, Colombia. It believed, in particular, that the two goals of non-proliferation and disarmament must be strictly fulfilled by States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in full compliance with its articles I, II and VI.

11. In response to the Russian Federation's decision to ratify the CTBT and START II, the United States should ratify the Test-Ban Treaty. Mongolia called on those two countries to consider fully implementing START II and embark on START III negotiations, which should ultimately include the other three nuclear-weapon States as well. The earliest possible entry into force of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty and the revitalization of the negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty were of paramount importance. His delegation also urged the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to elaborate a legally binding international instrument that would provide security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. Stressing the importance of the Treaty's universality, he appealed to India, Pakistan, Israel and Cuba to become parties as soon as possible.

12. Mongolia strongly advocated the strengthened safeguards systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and supported the additional protocol designed to improve and strengthen IAEA inspections. It was working with IAEA to conclude an additional protocol to its safeguards agreement; and a group of Mongolian experts would soon visit IAEA headquarters in that connection. Mongolia was also in the process of formalizing its participation in the International Monitoring System of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test-Ban-Treaty Organization. His Government attached great importance to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones and therefore welcomed the adoption by the United Nations Disarmament Commission of principles and guidelines on their establishment.

13. Mongolia had declared its territory a nuclear-weapon-free zone in 1992, and General Assembly resolution 53/77 D, entitled "Mongolia's international security and nuclear-weapon-free status" had been adopted in 1998 with the support of the international community, including the nuclear-weapon States. That demonstrated that non-proliferation could be strengthened if a State's unilateral action was supported by its immediate neighbours and the

international community. As a further step, in February, the Mongolian Parliament had adopted special legislation on the country's nuclear-weapon-free status, which had been supported by the Secretary-General and by the Non-Aligned Movement at its recent Ministerial Meeting. Together with United Nations bodies, Mongolia was exploring ways and means of addressing some of the issues relating to its broader security concerns in order to reinforce its nuclear-weapon-free status.

14. **Mr. Orhun** (Turkey) said that his delegation subscribed to the statement made on behalf of the European Union. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons remained the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential basis for nuclear disarmament. However, unless and until the Treaty enjoyed universal adherence, States parties would continue to be exposed to risks. Turkey, therefore, urged all States which were not yet parties to accede to the Treaty at the earliest possible time. The conclusion of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty had made a positive contribution to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, promoting the process of nuclear disarmament and strengthening international peace and security. Turkey had signed that Treaty on the day on which it had been opened for signature and had completed the ratification process in February 2000.

15. The inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons was a source of disappointment; his country hoped that the Conference on Disarmament would soon commence negotiations without any pre-conditions. The re-establishment of an ad hoc committee to negotiate on effective arrangements for security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States would also be an important step. Turkey attached great importance to the commitment by all States parties to fulfil all the obligations undertaken in 1995 and welcomed the unilateral and bilateral efforts of the nuclear-weapon States to comply with the relevant articles of the Treaty. It also welcomed the recent decision to ratify START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty by the Russian State Duma and hoped that that step would be conducive to the commencement of START III negotiations and have a positive impact on other arms control processes.

16. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, on the basis of arrangements concluded freely between States in their respective regions, would strengthen global as well as regional peace and security. Turkey welcomed the steps taken by States to establish new zones, and fully supported the initiative launched by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in 1998 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Central Asia. His country had repeatedly voiced concerns about the nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests conducted in South-East Asia in recent years, which had serious repercussions for regional and global security and stability.

17. In the Middle East, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction posed a tangible threat. Turkey had deep-rooted historical ties with the Middle East and maintained cordial relations with all the countries and peoples of the region. It was taking part in collective efforts aimed at devising measures to reverse the nuclear threat. The 2000 Conference should include further substantive steps for the next five years and address the objectives that had not been attained since 1995. The "resolution on the Middle East" must be implemented within that context.

18. Turkey firmly believed that the strengthening of safeguards was an important element of nuclear arms control and non-proliferation and was deeply concerned that there were still 54 parties to the Treaty which had not yet brought into force a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. The events following the Gulf War had proved the need for additional safeguards in order to prevent diversion of nuclear materials or equipment, purchased for peaceful purposes, to activities prohibited by the Treaty. His country was preparing to conclude in the near future the additional protocol with IAEA for the application of safeguards.

19. The best means of preventing illicit trafficking of nuclear materials was to apply measures of physical protection. Turkey hoped that the IAEA international physical protection service would be further strengthened and extended. The Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Zangger Committee had done valuable work to enhance transparency and foster dialogue and cooperation among all parties; Turkey had joined the Zangger Committee and was in the process of becoming a member of the nuclear suppliers group.

20. **Mr. Calovski** (The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) said that his delegation's views coincided

with those expressed by the representative of Portugal, speaking on behalf of the European Union. In 1995, his country had supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Decision No. 3 of the 1995 Conference was of crucial importance for strengthening the non-proliferation regime. In many regions, the security situation had been threatened more by other negative developments and destructive forces than by non-observance of the non-proliferation regime.

21. The 2000 Conference could be successful if it fully recognized that the international security situation had completely changed since 1990 and was still changing rapidly. The world was entering a period of cooperation and integration, and the forces of globalization would dominate in the years to come. Those forces favoured strict compliance with the non-proliferation regime and arms control; and those who did not grasp that reality would be marginalized. The observance of the Treaty was therefore an important contribution to the overall strengthening of international relations, the enhancement of international cooperation, and the strengthening of multilateralism, in particular the United Nations.

22. His Government's main priority was integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures and membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The observance of the Treaty by his country and the other States of the region was essential in that respect. It was also important that the General Assembly resolutions initiated by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, most recently resolution 54/62, should be fully implemented. The General Assembly had emphasized the importance of regional efforts in South-Eastern Europe on arms control, disarmament and confidence-building measures. One of the most important vehicles for achieving those objectives was the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe.

23. Although the danger of the use of nuclear weapons was diminishing, the threat of their use was not. On the other hand, interest in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy was increasing and should be supported. That factor, together with a greater capability in the field of nuclear technology, would increase the number of countries capable of producing nuclear weapons. The non-proliferation regime must address that danger and the parties to the Treaty must endeavour to prevent such an occurrence, in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty, the Charter of the United Nations and international law. For non-nuclear-weapon States like the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the main interest was to further strengthen the non-proliferation regime and agree on measures that would positively affect the security situation and economic and social development. His delegation stressed the beneficial influence of nuclear disarmament on the mobilization of resources for development in that regard.

24. He emphasized the importance of the accession of nine States to the Treaty since 1995. The Conference should address the necessity that four other States accede to the Treaty. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia maintained excellent relations with all those countries, which, traditionally, had been in favour of full observance of the Charter of the United Nations, a main base for the Treaty. His country had ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in March 2000. It was encouraging that so many States had signed and ratified it. The recent ratification by the Russian Federation represented an important incentive for other States, including the United States of America, whose leadership in the adoption of that Treaty had been highly praised.

25. It was regrettable that the Conference on Disarmament had not started negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. One reason was the Conference's outdated working methods, which were the same as during the cold war. His delegation hoped that the current difficulties would be overcome. In the area of nuclear disarmament, the long-awaited ratification of START II by the Russian Federation was a welcome development which should lead to the commencement of START III negotiations and progress on other issues, including the current state of relations among nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly in the Conference on Disarmament. So far, the nuclear-weapon States had refused to negotiate with the non-nuclear-weapon States, and it was not realistic to expect that they would change their position. However, that did not mean that the non-nuclear-weapon States should abandon the goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. They should strive to achieve that goal, shared also by the nuclear-weapon States, sooner rather than later.

26. The 2000 Conference should reaffirm the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was regrettable that there had been no progress in that regard in the Middle East, as called for

in the 1995 "Resolution on the Middle East". The Conference also needed to pay particular attention to safeguards and the peaceful use of nuclear energy, an area of utmost importance to the majority of States parties. It should insist on full-scope safeguards and greater transparency in nuclear-related export controls and should encourage all parties to the Treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The efforts to develop new and renewable energy sources should not be an obstacle in that respect. However, the dangers of old nuclear plants should be addressed, on the basis of international cooperation.

27. **Mr. Wisnumurti** (Indonesia) said that the Conference's task of reviewing the progress made in implementing the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the decisions and resolution adopted by the 1995 Conference had been rendered more difficult by the failure of the Preparatory Committee for the 2000 Conference to agree on substantive issues because of the differences between the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Nevertheless, there had been progress in the fields of non-proliferation and disarmament. His delegation was encouraged by the increase in the number of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), the approval for ratification by the Russian State Duma of the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), the consolidation of existing nuclear-weapon-free zones and the formulation by the Commission on Disarmament of guidelines on the establishment of new such zones.

28. On the other hand, the credibility of the non-proliferation regime had been gravely undermined by such developments as the conducting of nuclear tests in South Asia. In addition, the CTBT had yet to enter into force, negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices had not begun, and efforts to modernize nuclear arsenals, including through research, development and testing, continued. Plans for the deployment of a missile defence system and the prospect of the stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space were further causes for concern. Failure to acknowledge that dismal state of affairs would only deepen frustration.

29. It was critically important to reverse the growing perception that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was of dubious value and had become an instrument for the promotion of the interests of a handful of States. The Conference must adopt decisions on such issues as security assurances and measures to promote the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, and agree on a phased programme of nuclear disarmament. The final document should set out a series of goals to be accomplished by 2005, including ratification of the CTBT by all 44 States identified therein, cessation of sub-critical testing, and conclusion of a non-discriminatory and universally applicable fissile material cut-off convention.

30. The Conference must also reaffirm the integrity and importance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty). In order to reduce nuclear danger, nuclear weapons must be de-alerted and nuclear warheads decoupled from their delivery vehicles, tactical nuclear weapons must be eliminated, plans to deploy weapons in outer space must be withdrawn, measures must be adopted to achieve greater transparency in nuclear-related issues, and negotiations must begin on a third strategic arms reduction treaty with a view to achieving significantly deeper reductions. The Conference must ensure that States that had renounced nuclear weapons were not excluded from decision making on nuclear disarmament.

31. The Conference on Disarmament had a unique role to play in that regard. Those were modest, realistic and achievable steps that would preserve the Non-Proliferation Treaty and stop the dangerous arms race that loomed on the horizon. With respect to security assurances, the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon States could be addressed only by the conclusion of an international legally binding instrument. Another means of promoting a stable security environment was the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation called on the international community to support the establishment of such zones in north and central Asia and in the Middle East.

32. The decision on "Principles and objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted by the 1995 Conference had reaffirmed the inalienable right of all States parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as making the acceptance of full-scope IAEA safeguards a necessary precondition for the transfer of nuclear materials and technology. Broader participation in the elaboration of nuclear-related export controls would help to dispel the belief that the purpose of such controls went beyond non-

proliferation and that they impinged on the decision-making prerogatives of the recipient countries.

33. He noted with satisfaction that an increasing number of countries were concluding additional protocols to their Safeguards Agreements with IAEA, but was concerned that the Agency lacked funding for its technical cooperation programme. The depositary States, as sponsors of the "Resolution on the Middle East", had a special responsibility for ensuring its implementation. Regrettably, one State in the region had yet to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards. His delegation welcomed the establishment of a subsidiary body at the Conference to identify the steps required for the adherence of all States in the Middle East to the Treaty.

34. The Treaty's objectives of non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament were inseparable. It was not feasible to promote the non-proliferation regime without giving due regard to disarmament. In order to preserve the integrity of the Treaty, there must be significant and irreversible steps towards the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. In that connection, his delegation strongly supported the proposal by the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries to establish an open-ended inter-sessional standing committee to ensure the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Indonesia stood ready to contribute to that process.

35. **Mr. Al-Nasser** (Qatar) said that the 2000 Conference had inspired great hopes and aspirations that would be fulfilled only through serious and transparent work by the participants in the Conference and total adherence by the States parties to the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the package of commitments entered into at the 1995 Conference. Regrettably, the international community was far from having realized the goals of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament set out in the Treaty. As to the decisions and the resolution adopted at the 1995 Conference, the objective of universal adherence to the Treaty had not been achieved, negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material had yet to begin, the Preparatory Committee for the Conference had failed to produce any serious recommendations, and, although the Arab States of the Middle East had all acceded to the Treaty, Israel had yet to do so or to place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards.

36. The entire international community knew that Israel possessed nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, posing a grave threat to security in the Middle East. Furthermore, there was a real risk of radiological contamination from its unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Yet the States parties to the Treaty, particularly some nuclear-weapon States, turned a blind eye to those problems. Israel's intransigence had dealt a severe blow to the efforts to bring peace to the Middle East. Qatar therefore called on all countries to bring pressure to bear on Israel to accede to the Treaty, place its nuclear facilities under full-scope IAEA safeguards and eliminate its weapons of mass destruction in order to establish in the Middle East a zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems.

37. The nuclear-weapon States had a moral duty to provide the non-nuclear-weapon States with assurances against the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons, pursue negotiations with a view to concluding an agreement on the elimination of all nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame, and allow the transfer to developing countries of nuclear technology to assist them in their efforts to achieve prosperity for their peoples. Lastly, his delegation hoped that the Conference would become a milestone on the path to the establishment of a world free of nuclear weapons, in which humanity could enjoy peace, security and stability.

38. **Mr. Guliyev** (Azerbaijan) said that, with the end of global confrontation and the collapse of totalitarian ideologies, the international community had a unique opportunity to carry forward the process of disarmament and curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There had been remarkable achievements in those areas over the past decade, particularly the conclusion of CTBT and the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

39. The convening of the 2000 Conference demonstrated the continuing commitment of the States parties to the Preamble and provisions of the Treaty. Preserving the integrity of the Treaty was essential for international peace and security; and the attainment of the Treaty's universality was therefore a priority. His delegation called on all States not yet party to the Treaty to accede to it at the earliest date and without conditions, particularly those States that operated unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Conference should stress that every effort had to be made to curb

the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The cohesive application of a strict export control regime by both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States would make a substantial contribution in that area.

40. A commitment to the reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons was essential to regional and international security and stability and to achieving the fundamental goals of the Treaty. Azerbaijan therefore welcomed the decision to ratify START II by the State Duma of the Russian Federation and the measures that had been taken by other nuclear-weapon States to reduce their stockpiles of nuclear armaments. It commended Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine on their contribution to the implementation of article VI of the Treaty and, in particular, their decision to voluntarily withdraw all tactical and strategic nuclear weapons from their territories.

41. His country also supported the steps that had been taken since 1995 to conclude further nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties. He recalled in that connection the initiative which the President of Azerbaijan had launched in 1997 to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the southern Caucasus. Given the geostrategic location of that region and the conflicts which it was currently experiencing, the establishment of such a zone would mark an important milestone in the enhancement of security at both the regional and international levels and should therefore be supported by the international community.

42. The total elimination of nuclear weapons was the only genuine guarantee for non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, every effort should be made to put in place a legally binding regime of negative security assurances. Azerbaijan welcomed the establishment in March 1998 by the Conference on Disarmament of an Ad Hoc Committee on Negative Security Assurances. The Conference should vigorously seek to increase its membership in order to better reflect the changes that had taken place in international relations. IAEA played a crucial role in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and States that had not yet done so should conclude safeguards agreements with the Agency. He emphasized in that connection that nuclear safety was an essential prerequisite for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

43. Azerbaijan, which regarded combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as a priority of its foreign policy, had signed and ratified major international and legally binding instruments and had contributed to the efforts of the international community in that field. Even though it had no nuclear sites or nuclear material under its jurisdiction, his country had applied for IAEA membership in order to enhance its cooperation with the Agency. Situated as it was at the crossroads of potentially turbulent regions, Azerbaijan took all necessary precautions, including legislative measures, to prevent the transfer through its territory of any components, materials and technology related to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

44. **Mr. Al-Sindi** (Yemen) said that, as the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime over the previous 30 years, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had benefited all States. At the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, at which States parties had agreed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty and had adopted a number of Decisions and Resolutions, including the "Resolution on the Middle East", the United States of America and the Russian Federation had committed themselves to reducing their nuclear arsenals. More recently, the State Duma of the Russian Federation had decided to ratify both START II and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. For its part, the United Arab Emirates had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby bringing the goal of universality one step closer to reality.

45. Notwithstanding those favourable developments, doubts still persisted about the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, since a number of States remained outside its ambit. All the States in the Middle East had acceded to the Treaty, with the exception of Israel, which had given no indication that it intended to do so. The Conference should urge Israel to accede to the Treaty and to place all of its nuclear installations under the full-scope IAEA safeguards regime. The sponsors of the "Resolution on the Middle East" should also called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty without delay and to place all of its nuclear installations under the international safeguards regime as an important first step towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

46. The Conference should also request the States parties to the Treaty to refrain from the transfer or transport of nuclear equipment, know-how, resources or material. Lastly, his delegation supported the Egyptian proposal for the establishment of a

monitoring system in the Middle East and hoped that, as the new century unfolded, the international community would fully recognize the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as an instrument for the elimination of nuclear weapons based on a specific timetable.

47. **Mr. Cappagli** (Argentina) said that, since the restoration of its democracy, Argentina had taken a series of steps to strengthen its integration with neighbouring countries, intensify the dialogue between the countries of the southern hemisphere, ban weapons of mass destruction and place restrictions on certain types of conventional weapons. It had also participated in efforts to promote international security and stability based on democratic values, the rule of law, human rights and free markets. The nation had been particularly active at the regional level, where, together with its neighbours, it had developed a framework for coexistence based on cooperation, transparency and integration.

48. Argentina reaffirmed its unwavering commitment to the international community's objectives of non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It had contributed to those objectives by the transparency, mutual trust and coordination that had characterized its relations with Brazil in the nuclear field. The two States had established a system of mutual safeguards for their nuclear installations and materials, which was reinforced by their acceptance of IAEA safeguards and their accession to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

49. Argentina had also signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation regime. It welcomed the subsequent accession of Brazil and Chile and urged all States that were not yet parties to accede to the Treaty as early as possible. Given the importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty not only to the maintenance of international peace and security but also to the very survival of mankind, States had a moral obligation to comply with its provisions. The balance of obligations between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, however, in no way legitimized the permanent possession of such weapons nor did it release nuclear-weapon States from their obligations in the area of disarmament. Those States should speed up the reduction of their nuclear arsenals with a view to the total elimination of such weapons in the near future.

50. The obligation of the nuclear-weapon States was all the greater as they were also permanent members of the Security Council. The 2000 Review Conference should seek to strengthen certain aspects of the Treaty, such as its provisions concerning Safeguards Agreements, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and nuclear export controls. The Conference should also undertake an in-depth review of the Treaty's implementation, identify future steps to be taken and commit the international community to action.

51. The maintenance of international peace and security was becoming increasingly complex and no effort should be spared to avert the danger of a nuclear war and its inescapable consequences. The international strategic situation had deteriorated in recent years with the nuclear tests that had been carried out in South Asia in 1998 and the lack of progress by the nuclear-weapon States towards disarmament. Delegations to the 2000 Conference should therefore show the greatest flexibility so that the Conference could effectively address those concerns.

52. A more positive trend had been noted, however, in the bilateral and/or unilateral reduction by some nuclear-weapon States of their nuclear arsenals and the recent ratification by the Russian Federation of START II. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty facilitated the process of eliminating nuclear weapons already begun by the nuclear-weapon States and the international community should be kept informed of the interim measures adopted pending the total elimination of those arsenals.

53. In order to advance towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, the international community had elaborated a series of instruments and taken a number of initiatives that together constituted the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The success of that regime was dependent on the support of all States. The signature, ratification and entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and a start to negotiations on a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons would therefore go a long way towards demonstrating the international community's commitment to the goal of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in all their aspects.

54. IAEA safeguards were crucial to ensuring that nuclear materials for peaceful uses were not diverted to other uses. In addition, bilateral and regional safeguards promoted greater transparency and mutual

trust between neighbouring States. The regime of bilateral safeguards developed by Argentina and Brazil, for example, was highly effective and could serve as a model for other regions of the world. Acceptance of IAEA safeguards and a commitment to the peaceful use of nuclear energy as a condition for the supply of nuclear materials and technology were becoming the norm. Nuclear export control regimes had an important role to play in promoting cooperation in the nuclear field and should be viewed not as restrictions on legitimate access to nuclear technology but as guidelines for responsible nuclear export policies.

55. The Treaty placed no restrictions on the legitimate and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Indeed, it guaranteed the economic and technological development of the parties through international cooperation in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including the international exchange of equipment and material for the processing, use and production of nuclear materials for peaceful purposes. Such activities must be carried out in a transparent manner and in compliance with internationally accepted norms for the safety and physical protection of nuclear materials. In that connection, cooperation in the pertinent forums was essential in order to strengthen the norms that regulated the transport by sea of radioactive wastes.

56. Nuclear-weapon-free zones made a significant contribution to international peace and security as areas that were free from the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons. Argentina hoped that other regions, especially those that were hotbeds of tension, would follow the example of Latin America and the Caribbean and establish similar zones, which significantly promoted development.

57. *Mr. Baali (Algeria) resumed the Chair.*

Election of Chairmen and Vice-Chairmen of the Main Committees, the Drafting Committee and the Credentials Committee *(continued)*

58. **The President** said that Mr. Koeffler of Austria had been nominated as the second Vice-Chairman of the Credentials Committee and that, in addition, Greece had been nominated as the sixth member of that Committee.

59. *Mr. Koeffler (Austria) was elected as a Vice-Chairman and Greece was elected as a member of the Credentials Committee.*

Organization of work

60. **The President** said that the General Committee had considered requests from the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (OPANAL), the League of Arab States and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to make statements in the plenary meeting of the Conference. Since there had been no objection to those requests, he took it that the Conference wished to extend an invitation to OPANAL, the League of Arab States and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials to make statements in a plenary meeting of the Conference.

61. *It was so decided.*

62. **The President** said that, at the same meeting, the General Committee had considered the query by Cuba, an observer to the Conference, as to whether it could circulate its documents as official documents of the Conference. Since the rules of procedure were not clear in that respect and since, at the 1990 Review Conference, several States non-parties to the Treaty had been allowed to circulate their documents as official documents, the General Committee had had no objection to continuing that practice. He therefore took it that the Conference wished to continue to issue documents submitted by observer States as official documents.

63. *It was so decided.*

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.